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Local Governmental Exposure to Antitrust
Liability and Treble Damages Awards
in the Wake of City of Lafayette
and City of Boulder
Thomas S. Malciauskas*
and
Sandra TalianiRasnak**
INTRODUCTION
In Parker v. Brown,1 the United States Supreme Court announced a broad state action exemption from antitrust liability,
holding for the first time that a state, acting in its sovereign
capacity, could not be liable for violating the federal antitrust
laws. Since Parker,however, the Court has restricted the scope of
the state action doctrine by ruling that units of local government, unlike states, could be held liable under the antitrust laws
for enacting ordinances found to be anticompetitive. Specifically,
the Court in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.2 determined that local governmental units are not immune
from the operation of the federal antitrust laws unless their anticompetitive activity is in furtherance or implementation of a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy. 3
Moreover, the Court in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder 4 recently found that a state's delegation of home rule
powers to a municipality was not sufficient to shield the city
with Parkerv. Brown state action immunity.

* Associate, Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago, Illinois; B.A.
1975, University of Illinois (Champaign); J.D. 1978, Loyola University of Chicago School

of Law.
** B.A. 1975, Phi Beta Kappa, University of Illinois (Champaign); J.D. 1979, Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law.
1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
2. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
3. Id. at 410.
4. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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The Court's decisions in City of Lafayette and City of Boulder
reflect a restrained view of federalism coupled with a strong policy preference favoring antitrust enforcement. However, the Court
has left unanswered the question of what remedies may be
appropriately applied to local governments found to be antitrust
violators. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person
injured by an antitrust violation "shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 5 The mandatory nature of section 4 and
the potential for huge damages awards raise a basic concern
among those who may eventually have to pay such damages
-local governmental units, their officers and officials, and ultimately, the taxpayers.
The Court's decisions have caused local governments to anticipate an aftermath of paralyzed decision-making and possible
raids on municipal treasuries. This article examines the liability
and treble damages exposure local governments face in light of
City of Boulder and City of Lafayette. First, this article traces
the development of the state action doctrine and its application
to local governments. Next, it discusses the financial burden on
local governments that will result if they are held liable for antitrust violations. This article then suggests a possible defense
that local governments may be successful in raising in order to
avoid antitrust liability, as well as examining congressional bills
that have proposed limitations on liability. It then turns to the
issue of local governments' exposure to antitrust treble damages
and discusses whether those local governments that are held to
have violated the antitrust laws can avoid the imposition of treble damages based on the legislative history of the antitrust laws
and public policy. In addition, this article reviews a bill recently
passed by the House of Representatives that proposes a broadbased exemption from treble damages liability for local governments. This article concludes that a judicial or legislative response
is necessary which will limit local governments' antitrust liability to single damages and injunctive relief, or no liability, depending on the nature of the anticompetitive act of the local
government.

5. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND
ITS APPLICATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

An examination of the scope of treble damages liability for
local governments must begin by reviewing the genesis of the
state action doctrine. 6 In 1943, the Supreme Court in Parker v.
Brown 7 established the state action doctrine, also referred to as
the Parkerdoctrine, in holding that the Federal antitrust laws do
not apply to an act that can be attributed to a state in the
implementation of its governmental policy.8 Parker v. Brown
involved a state anticompetitive marketing program which restricted competition among raisin growers in order to maintain
prices in the raisin market. 9 A raisin producer-packer brought
suit against California officials alleging that the program was a
restraint of trade, and therefore invalid under the Sherman
Act.10

The Supreme Court held that California's anticompetitive
marketing program did not violate the Sherman Act because the

6. The state action doctrine was formulated in Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911
(C.D.S.C. 1895), where the court upheld a South Carolina law preventing private parties
from selling distilled spirits. Since the state properly exercised its power to regulate local
trade, no restraint of trade could be found from the fact that only authorized state agents
could market spirits.
7. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
8. Id. at 352. For a discussion of the Parker doctrine and a collection of lower court
decisions involving its application to local governments, see Annot., 70 L. Ed. 2d 973
(1982). Several commentators have argued that the state action doctrine is overbroad and
should be narrowed. See, e.g., Posner, The ProperRelationship Between State Regulation
and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 693, 697 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and
Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71
(1974).
9. The California Agricultural Prorate Act authorized the establishment of such a
program. The avowed purpose of the Act was to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the
State" and to "prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products" of the
state. 317 U.S. at 346. The marketing program required raisin growers to pool a large
percentage of their crop and allow a state program committee to control the classification
and distribution of raisins. The program prevented Brown from marketing his crop and
fulfilling contracts he had previously negotiated. Id. at 346-49.
10. 317 U.S. at 348-49. Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes unlawful "every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 covers agreements between two or more persons,
generally competitors, which unreasonably restrain trade. The Court also found that the
state did not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 makes it
unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States." Id. Section 2 covers unilateral business activity and forbids the monopolization
or attempted monopolization of a market for a particular product or service.
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antitrust laws were not intended to prohibit competitive restraints
imposed by a state as an act of government.11 In the Court's
view, the anticompetitive marketing program was an act of
government because the state, acting through its agriculture
commission, adopted and enforced the program pursuant to state
governmental policy. 12 The Court stated that neither the lan-

guage nor the legislative history of the Sherman Act indicated
that it was intended to "restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature."' 13 In contrast, the
Court found that the purpose of the Sherman Act was to prohibit
private parties from engaging in anticompetitive activities. 14 In
support of its finding that the antitrust laws do not apply to
state action, the Court concluded that under our federal system
of government "an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress."15
Beginning in 1975, the contours of the Parker doctrine were
refined and narrowed by a series of Supreme Court decisions
which addressed the application of the state action immunity to
private parties, state agencies, and local governmental units
claiming to be exempt from antitrust liability under the state
action doctrine. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 6 plaintiffs
alleged that a minimum fee schedule for lawyers was a restraint
of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 7 The fee schedule
was published by a county bar association and enforced by the
state bar association through the issuance of ethical opinions
that indicated that an attorney's failure to adhere to fee schedules could result in disciplinary action being taken against him

11. 317 U.S. at 351.
12. Id. at 350.
13. Id. at 350-51. The Court assumed that such a marketing program would be a violation of the antitrust laws if it was made effective through a conspiracy of private parties.
Id. at 350. Furthermore, the Court noted that a state cannot confer immunity from antitrust violations on private parties by declaring that their anticompetitive activities are
lawful. Id. at 351. Here, however, the program was not operated by force of individual

agreement or combination, but instead "derived its authority and its efficacy from the
legislative command of the state." Id. at 350. Accordingly, the Court upheld California's
anticompetitive marketing program.
14. Id. at 351.

15.

Id.

16.
17.

421 U.S. 773, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 10.
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by the state bar.'8 The defendants claimed that their publication

and enforcement of the minimum fee schedule were actions of
the state because the state supreme court had authorized the
state bar to issue ethical opinions and had directed lawyers to
consider published standard fee schedules. 19
The Court rejected the defendants' contention that they qualified for state action immunity under the antitrust laws. The
Court held that the promulgation and enforcement of the minimum fee schedule did not qualify for such immunity because the
Virginia Supreme Court Rules neither required nor directed the
anticompetitive acts of the bar associations. 20 On the contrary,
in an ethical canon, the state supreme court stated that attorneys "were not to be controlled by minimum fee schedules."'2 1 In
conclusion, the Court observed that although the Virginia State
Bar was a state agency for some purposes, it was not a state
agency for all purposes. 22 Accordingly, its status as a state
agency did not mean that all its activities were regarded as state
action, thereby entitling it to an exemption from liability for
23
anticompetitive practices which benefit its members.
The Court again considered the applicability of the state action
defense to the activities of a state bar association in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona.24 In Bates, the Court found that the

18. 421 U.S. at 776-78. Fairfax County Bar Association, a voluntary association of
lawyers, published a minimum fee schedule. The Virginia State Bar had published
reports and ethical opinions indicating that attorneys had to comply with minimum fee

schedules. The state bar purportedly had the power to enforce adherence to the schedules
through disciplinary proceedings. Id.
19. Id. at 789-90 & n.19. The Virginia Legislature authorized the state supreme court
to regulate the practice of law. Pursuant to this authorization, the court adopted ethical
codes. One such ethical code stated that lawyers could consider fee schedules in determining the price for a particular service. The state bar argued that its action was state action
because the state had granted it power to issue ethical opinions and by issuing opinions
dealing with fee schedules, it was merely implementing the fee provisions of this ethical
code. Fairfax County Bar Association contended that, although it was not a state agency,
its publication of a fee schedule was state action because it was "prompted" to issue such
a schedule because of this ethical code and the Virginia State Bar's ethical opinions.
20. Id. at 790. In this regard, the Court stated: "In our view that is not state action for
Sherman Act purposes. It is not enough that... anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by
state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by the direction of the
State acting as sovereign." Id. at 791.
21. Id. at 789.
22. Id. at 791.
23. Id.
24. 433 U.S. 350, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
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defendant state bar association's enforcement of a ban on price
advertising by lawyers, alleged to be a restraint of trade, 25 was
not a violation of the Sherman Act. In contrast to Goldfarb, the
state bar's conduct was immune from antitrust liability under
the state action doctrine because the restraint was adopted by
the state supreme court, not the state bar.26 The Arizona Supreme
Court had delegated the authority to enforce the disciplinary rule
banning advertisements by lawyers to the state bar. association. 27 The Court held that because the state supreme court was
charged by the state with regulating the practice of law, the restraint "was compelled by direction of the state acting as sovereign." 28 Such anticompetitive acts by the state are exempt from

antitrust liability under the Parkerdoctrine.
In Cantor v.DetroitEdison Co.,29 the Supreme Court addressed
the application of the state action doctrine to the activities of a
private party. An electric utility company's program which provided for the distribution of free light bulbs to its customers was
attacked as a restraint of trade and an attempted monopolization. 30 In Cantor, a state regulatory commission approved rate
structures submitted by private utilities. The commission approved a rate structure proposal submitted by the defendant
Detroit Edison Company which had included a plan to distribute
free light bulbs. 31 The Court rejected the defendant's argument
that because the state commission had approved its rate structure, the anticompetitive light bulb program was compelled by
the state and therefore exempt from antitrust liability under the
Parkerdoctrine.
The Court noted that the state did not require electric utility
companies to distribute free light bulbs. In fact, the state had no
regulatory policy regarding this matter. 32 Instead, the commission had passively approved the light bulb program when it was

25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 10.
26. 433 U.S. at 359-60.
27. Id. at 361.
28. Id. at 360 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
29. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
30. Id. at 581. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). See also supra note 10.
31. 428 U.S. at 583.
32. Id. at 584. The Court observed that there was no Michigan statute which authorized the regulation of the light bulb business. In addition, no state agency had investigated the desirability of the light bulb distribution program, nor did any other Michigan
utility company have such a program.

19841

Local Governments and Antitrust

included as part of the overall rate proposal. 33 Because such a
program did not constitute an act of the state in the implementation of a state governmental policy, the defendant was subject to
liability for antitrust violations.
Reflecting a disfavor of antitrust exemptions, the Court in
Goldfarb, Bates, and Cantor narrowed the scope of the Parker
doctrine. The Court observed that state action immunity would
only apply where the state, -acting as sovereign, has compelled
the specific anticompetitive conduct. This principle was extended
to the anticompetitive practices of state political subdivisions in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.34 In City of
Lafayette, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
units of local government which are neither states nor private
entities, but creatures of the state with broadly delegated powers
and a separate governmental character, are exempt from liability under the antitrust laws.
In City of Lafayette, a privately-owned electric utility company
charged that an electric utility company owned and operated by
35
the city of Lafayette, Louisiana had violated the antitrust laws.
A majority of the Court rejected at the outset the city's contention that local governments, because of their status as local
governments, were not intended to be subject to the antitrust
laws. 36 The city then argued that Parker v. Brown held that all
governmental entities are exempt from antitrust laws by virtue
of their status as state agencies or subdivisions of a state. A plu-

33. Id. at 585.
34. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
35. Id. at 392. The city of Lafayette, Louisiana, together with the nearby city of Plaquemine, Louisiana, alleged that Louisiana Power & Light Co. conspired with others to
restrain trade and monopolize the production of electrical power by preventing the construction and operation of other utility systems, by refusing to wheel power, by withholding supplies from its own market, by engaging in boycotts against the cities, and by
instituting sham litigation to prevent the construction of electrical facilities beneficial to
the cities. Id. at 392 n.5. The Louisiana Power & Light Co. counterclaimed alleging that
the petitioners had engaged in sham litigation to prevent the construction of electrical
facilities; eliminated competition by covenants in their debentures; excluded competition
by using long-term supply agreements; and displaced competition by requiring the
defendant's customers to purchase electricity from the petitioners in order to continue to
receive water and gas service. Id. at 392 n.6.
36. Besides arguing that it was exempt under the Parkerdoctrine, the city also argued
that Congress never intended to subject local governments to the antitrust laws. Id. at
394. In response, the Court stated that because cities, as well as states, are clearly "persons" under the statutory terms of the antitrust statutes, the city of Lafayette's conten-
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rality of the Court rejected this argument and maintained that
Parker only 37
exempts "an action of government" by the State as
"sovereign." The court cited Goldfarb and Bates as examples
of the application of the Parkerdoctrine to governmental entities.
In Goldfarb,the Court noted, the actions of a state bar association were not held exempt from antitrust liability under the
authority of Parker because the anticompetitive effects of a minimum fee schedule were not directed by the state. 38 In Bates,
however, the state bar was immunized from antitrust liability
because the state bar association's enforcement of the disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from advertising their services
was "compelled by direction of the State as sovereign." 39 The
Court reiterated the significance it attached in Bates to the fact
that the disciplinary rule was part of a "comprehensive regulatory system" and the restraint was "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed" by the state supreme court as the state's

tion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable under the antitrust laws
must be based on an overriding public policy which would negate the statutory construction of coverage. In addition, the city's argument had to be considered "in light of the
presumption against implied exclusion from coverage under the antitrust laws." Id. at
398. The Court noted that only two policies had been held by it to be sufficiently weighty
to override this presumption. Id. at 399. One such policy was enunciated in Parker u.
Brown, where competition as a fundamental principle governing commerce was overridden by federalism principles. The Court in Parkerenunciated the justification for exclusion on this basis:
[I]n a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
Parker,317 U.S. at 351.
The Court maintained that the city of Lafayette had not sustained its burden in showing that there were sufficiently weighty policies to overcome the presumption that municipalities were intended to be held liable under the antitrust laws. Although the likely
goal of a municipally-owned utility is to confer benefits on its residents, the economic
choices made by a public corporation in its business affairs are no more likely to further
national economic goals than private corporations acting in the interests of their shareholders. In this regard, the Court stated:
If municipalities were free to make economic choices counseled solely by their
own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a
serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds
with the comprehensive national policy Congress established.
435 U.S. at 408 (footnote omitted).
37. 435 U.S. at 409. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens comprised the
plurality. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion and Justices Stewart, White,
Rehnquist and Blackmun dissented.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 410 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. at 360).
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policy maker. 40 In the Court's view, these decisions required the
rejection of the city of Lafayette's contention that its status as a
subdivision of the state entitled it to the state action exemption
from antitrust liability. 4 1 Furthermore, the Court stated that to
extend the Parkerdoctrine to municipalities would be inconsistent with the principles of federalism underlying its decision in
that case. In this regard, the Court stated "[c]ities are not themselves sovereign, they do not receive all the federal deference of
42
the States that create them."
The Court stated that although a municipality's status as a
state agent or subdivision of the state does not by itself place it
within the Parkerexemption, this does not require the conclusion
that all of its anticompetitive activities are subject to the antitrust laws. 43 The Court maintained that actions of municipalities may reflect a state policy which will entitle them to Parker
immunity because "[m]unicipal corporations are instrumentalities of the State for the convenient administration of government
within their limits. '44 In other words, municipalities are exempt
from antitrust liability to the same extent as a state when they
act as state agencies implementing state policy.
The Court then delineated the standard by which a municipality's action would be deemed "state action." The Court stated
that a municipality could avail itself of the Parkerexemption by
demonstrating that it was either directed by the state to act anticompetitively in a particular area or authorized to act anticompetitively "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service." 45 The Court stated that
for a municipality to be exempt under the Parkerdoctrine pursuant to state authorization, it need not point to "specific, detailed
legislative authorization. ' 46 Rather, "an adequate state mandate
for anticompetitive activities of cities and other subordinate
governmental units exists when it is found 'from the authority
given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that

40. Id.
41. Id.at 411.
42. Id. at 412.
43. Id. at 413.
44. Id. (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287
(1883)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 415.
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the legislature contemplated"' the anticompetitive activity. 47 The
plurality dismissed the dissent's contention that the execution of
legitimate government programs would be hindered by its decision because such programs will be protected from antitrust lia48
bility when directed or authorized by the state.
The position taken by the plurality in City of Lafayette was
adopted by a majority of the Court in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.49 The controversy in City of Boulder
arose when the city of Boulder, Colorado, through its constitutional home rule powers, 50 enacted an ordinance imposing a
moritorium on geographical expansion of the one cable television company licensed to operate in a portion of the city. The
ordinance was designed to encourage the entry of potential competitors while the city prepared new cable television legislation. 5 1 The cable television company alleged that the moritorium
on its expansion constituted a restraint of trade.

47. Id. (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.
1976), aff'd, 435 U.S. 389 (1978)). This "clearly articulated" test was later followed by the
Court in New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) and California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). In New Motor
Vehicle Bd., the Court reviewed the antitrust exposure of a California board charged with
the responsibility of evaluating applications for opening new automobile dealerships.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. involved a California statutory scheme prohibiting wine wholesalers from selling to retailers without adopting a uniform price schedule filed with the
state. Reaffirming its analysis of the "clearly articulated" test, the Court in Midcal Aluminum, Inc. added that the challenged policy itself must also be actively supervised by
the state.
The Court in City of Boulder reserved the question of whether active state supervision
must be present for a municipality to be exempt under the Parker doctrine. 455 U.S. at
51-52 n.14. However, in dissent, Justice Rehnquist argues that such supervision is not
necessary. 455 U.S. at 71 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). One commentator has agreed
with Justice Rehnquist, stating:
It is impractical and somewhat illogical to require a municipality to show that
the state actively supervised its conduct. After all, the city is the creature of the
state and often the intended instrument of its policies. If the state clearly
intended that the city be permitted to take a course of action, it should not
additionally be required to supervise that course.
Hoskins, The "Boulder Revolution" in Municipal Antitrust Law, 70 ILL. B.J. 684, 686
(1982). See also Hoover v. Ronwein, 52 U.S.L.W. 4535, 4539 (U.S. May 14, 1984) (holding
that active state supervision is not required where a state directs a person to act).
48. 435 U.S. at 417.
49. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
50. The city of Boulder was organized as a home rule municipality under the Constitution of the State of Colorado. As a home rule municipality, the city had the power to
exercise "the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters." CoO.
CONST. art. XX, § 6.

51.

455 U.S. at 46.
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Although the state's general grant of home rule powers to
municipalities emphasized the decentralization of government,
the state expressed no specific policy regarding municipal regulation of cable television.5 2 Consistent with the Court's reasoning in City of Lafayette, the Supreme Court determined that the
city of Boulder could not avail itself of state action immunity
from antitrust liability unless such conduct constituted either: (1)
the action of the state itself in its sovereign capacity or (2) local
governmental action in furtherance or implementation of a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." 53
With respect to the first point, the Court relied on City of
Lafayette and stated that the actions of home rule cities are not
equivalent to actions of the state itself.54 Under our dual system
of sovereignty, cities are not themselves sovereign. The Court
55
stated: "We are a nation not of 'city-states' but of states."
With respect to the second point, the Court held that "clear
articulation" of a state policy to displace competition in a particular area is not satisfied by general grants of home rule authority
from the state's constitution:
Acceptance of such a proposition-that the general grant
of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state
authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances-would wholly eviscerate the concepts of "clear
articulation and affirmative expression" that our prece56
dents require.
The Court observed that the position of the State of Colorado
regarding Boulder's anticompetitive cable television ordinance
was one of "precise neutrality."5 7 The state had not addressed
such regulation and merely allowed its cities to do as they
pleased in this area. Thus, the state could have hardly "contemplated" the anticompetitive actions for which antitrust immunity
58
was sought.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist predicted that the majority's

52. Id. at 55.
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id. at 52-54.
55. Id. at 54 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d
704, 717 (1980) (Markey, C.J., dissenting)). See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667
n.12, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Lincoln County v. Lunig, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
56. 455 U.S. at 56.
57. Id. at 55.
58. Id.
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decision would hinder local governments' efforts to exercise
their police powers and undermine the concepts of home rule by
altering the relationship between states and cities5 9 However,
in a separately concurring opinion, Justice Stevens admonished
that the dissents' "dire predictions" for cities should "be viewed
with skepticism" since holding local government actions to
antitrust scrutiny would not be tantamount to findng an anti60
trust violation.
RAMIFICATIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' EXPOSURE
TO ANTITRUST LIABILITY
Understandably, the Court's decisions in City of Lafayette and
City of Boulder have caused municipalities great concern over
their potential liability for antitrust violations. This concern is
heightened by the specter of treble damages liability which is
imposed on those who violate the antitrust laws. 61 Antitrust
damages awards could result in staggering costs for municipal
governments found to have violated the antitrust laws. For
example, in City of Lafayette, the plaintiff sought $180 million
62
as a result of only one of its antitrust claims against the city.
Trebled, this amounts to $540 million. This award divided among
the residents of the defendant city would result in a penalty that
would exceed $28,000 thousand for each family of four. 63 In a
recent antitrust case, claimants have filed suit against a city and
its officials seeking treble damages of $250 million for alleged
anticompetitive zoning restrictions. 64 In another. recent case, a
court awarded $28.5 million in treble damages in response to a
city and county's anticompetitive use of their waste treatment
65
facilities.

59. Id. at 60, 70-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 58 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens observed that the seven-year-old
prognostications of doom for public utilities set forth by the dissent in Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. at 615, had yet to come to pass. 455 U.S. at 58 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
62. 435 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 442 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. Richmond Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1088 (4th Cir. 1982).
65. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, No. 81 C 2745 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 12, 1984). H.R.

6027 proposes eliminating treble damages liability for a wide range of municipal activities. H.R. 6027, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H8623 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1984). See
infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. The award in Unity Ventures was cited by
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Imposing treble damages liability against local governmental
units will result in financial drains on limited municipal budgets
which could debilitate governmental decision-making. 66 Furthermore, the brunt of such awards would ultimately fall on municipal taxpayers whose assessments would be increased to pay for
antitrust damages. Moreover, treble damages awards may have
a significant impact on the ability of local governments to
finance projects through the municipal bond market. 67 If a city
must agree to enact potentially anticompetitive regulations to
obtain bond financing for a public project, the mere possibility of
an antitrust challenge to the regulatory scheme may result in the

many congressmen as exemplifying the imperative need for a legislative limitation on
local governments' treble damages antitrust exposure. See 130 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily
ed. Aug. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Seiberling) ("A county and township of Illinois are
the subject of a $28.5 million verdict that threatens these governments with financial
ruin, or their taxpayers, as the case may be."). Representative Crane stated:
Legal fees [in the Unity Ventures litigation] are already approaching $1 million. If upheld, this will have a tremendous negative impact on the day-to-day
management of government affairs and decisionmaking in Lake County.
Although Lake County is one of the wealthier per capita counties in the United States, if this judgment is not reversed it could very well become bankrupt.
The impact on the taxpayer will be severe. The judgment entered in this case is
6,000 percent of the property tax collected last year by the village of Grayslake
and 150 percent of the amount collected by all of Lake County. If Lake County
were to increase its taxes to the maximum legal rate and still provide necessary
services to its citizens, it would take the taxpayers 70 years to pay this judgment. Even if they used all of their cash reserves of $14.8 million, payment
would still require 35 years.
Id. at H8472-73. See also id. at H8473 (statement of Rep. Hyde); id. at H8475 (statement of
Rep. Edwards).
66. Some argue that the Court's decisions in City of Lafayette and City of Boulder
will open the floodgates of litigation where numerous antitrust claims will be brought
against local governments. See Local Government Antitrust Liability, The Boulder Decision: HearingsBefore the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1982)
(statement of Thomas Mood, Mayor of Columbus, Ohio) [hereinafter cited as Hearings];
id. at 45-56 (statement of Janet Gray Hayes, Mayor of San Jose, Calif.); Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 518 (1979). Others
argue that antitrust suits will only be brought against local governments in the most
egregious circumstances and that the operations of local governments will not be curtailed by antitrust liability, and potential liability. See generally McMahon, City of
Boulder Revisited, National Ass'n of Attorneys General Antitrust Rep. (Oct. 1982); Note,
City of Lafayette, Louisiana v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.: Will Municipal Antitrust
Liability Doom Effective State-Local Government Relations?, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 129
(1979). See also Hearings, supra, at 2 (statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice); id. at 120 (statement of Donald R. Russell,
senior vice-president, Sunco. Prods. Co.).
67. See, e.g., Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,536
(N.D. Ohio 1983).
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issuance of unfavorable opinions from bond counsel. Such opinions may discourage bond underwriters from supporting the
bond issue.
The award of attorney's fees, which is specifically provided for
in the Clayton Act,68 may be as financially devastating for
municipalities as the potential payment of treble damages. Attorney's fees have not only been substantial in antitrust cases, but
in some instances they have exceeded damages. 69 In addition,
regardless of whether antitrust liability is imposed against a
municipality, the legal fees of outside counsel and the actual
costs of antitrust litigation create additional concerns.70 The dissent in City of Lafayette recognized that antitrust litigation will
require municipalities to pay expensive attorney's fees. The dissent noted that "[legal fees to defend one current antitrust suit
have been estimated as at least one-half million dollars a
71
month."
The prospect of municipal treble damages liability is particularly troubling because local governments may be faced with
antitrust lawsuits for a myriad of their activities. These activities
involve land use and zoning,7 2 sewage treatment, 73 cable televi-

68. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
69. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Virginia Academy
of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 543 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Va. 1982); In re Cement
and Concrete Antitrust Litig., 515 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Ariz. 1981).
70. Few local governments have in-house antitrust counsel capable of preparing adequate defenses in complex antitrust litigation. See Hearings,supra note 66, at 65 (statement of William Hefty, city attorney, Richmond, Va.):
But what I would like to emphasize is the expense of the litigation, even if the
city ultimately is victorious. Antitrust litigation is new to cities, and most city
attorneys' offices do not have the staff to handle such litigation.
...This is expensive litigation; for example, it could easily cost the city of
Richmond hundreds of thousands of dollars to successfully defend the current
case. This is what cities across the country are concerned about.
Id.
71. 435 U.S. at 441 n.31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
72. E.g., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983). See Comment, Antitrust Laws, Zoning and
Agreements to Zone, Delegation of Police Powers after Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 25 S.D. L. REV. 316 (1980).
73. E.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted,52 U.S.L.W. 3891 (U.S. June 11, 1984) (No. 82-1832); Unity Ventures v. County of
Lake, No. 81 C 2745 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1984); Vickery Manor Serv. Corp. v. Village of
Mundelein, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,790 (N.D. 111. 1983).
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sion franchising, 74 ambulance services, 75 airport operations 76
and concessions, 77 business licensing, 78 water supplies, 79 and
80
parking facilities.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' LIABILITY FOR
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
Defense to Antitrust Liability
Commentators have expressed concern over municipalities'
potential liability for antitrust violations, especially in situations
where a municipality regulates activities which are recognized
as traditional government functions.8 1 Accordingly, commentators have proposed affirmative defenses that a municipality may
be successful in asserting in response to antitrust claims brought
against it.82 These commentators have seized upon a suggestion
made by the Court in City of Lafayette and reiterated in City of

74. E.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd on rehearing,
No. 81-2335 (5th Cir. July 16, 1984).
75. E.g., Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983);
Springs Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of Rancho Mirage, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,
646 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
76. E.g., Pueblo Aircraft Serv. Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982).
77. E.g., Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 676 F.2d 1380 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 816 (1983).
78. E.g., Campbell v. City of Chicago, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,684 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,448
(C.D. Cal. 1983).
79. E.g., Community Builders v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Lockary
v. Kayfetz, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,594 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
80. E.g., Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum v. City of Cincinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.

Ohio 1983).
81. James, Municipal Defenses to Antitrust Liability,6 U. ARK. LrrnTE ROCK L.J. 273,
293 (1983) ("Special consideration should be given to traditional government services or
those necessary to protect the public health, safety and welfare."). See also Brame &
Feller, The Immunity of Local Governments and Their Officials From Antitrust Claims
After City of Boulder, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 705, 715-18 (1982); Tannenbaum, The Future of
MunicipalRegulation of Cable Television: PluggedIn or Tuned Out?, 15 Loy. U. CHI. UJ.

33, 56-59 (1983).
82. See Brame & Feller, supra note 81, at 715-18 (These authors state that a "public
interest" defense to antitrust liability may be successful for local governments. "If

allowed, this defense would protect local government actions in which the public health,
safety and welfare purpose and benefits outweigh the anticompetitive effects." Id. at
715.); James, supra note 81, at 290-304 (This commentator advocates a municipal rule of
reason defense: "[Ulnder a municipal rule of reason, anticompetitive activity reasonably
necessary to protect the public health, safety and welfare should not subject a municipality to antitrust liability." Id. at 294.). Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in City of
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Boulder that a municipal defendant should be treated differently
from a private party defendant for purposes of liability under the
antitrust laws. The Court stated: "It may be that certain activities which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by
on a different complexion when adopted by
private parties, take '83
government.
local
a
The Court cited a law review article written by Paul Posner in
support of this statement.84 On the page of the article cited by
the Court, Posner asserts that a state should be able to raise a
special defense to antitrust claims because of its status as a
governmental body. 85 Presumably, the Supreme Court by citing
Posner's article indicated that a municipality should be able to
utilize such a defense because of its status as a governmental
body.
Lafayette and City of Boulder, two commentators who viewed the Parkerdoctrine as too
broad in its exemption of state anticompetitive acts suggested application of a balancing
test to state activities similar to the one advocated by Brame & Feller, supra note 81, at
715-18, for local government. See Posner, supra note 8, at 707-14 (advocating balancing
test which weighs benefits of regulation against economic effect); Slater, supra note 8, at
104-08 (advocating balancing test where regulation could be defended based on need for
regulation). See also Tannenbaum, supra note 81, at 56-59 ("By raising a public interest
defense, a municipality should be able to avoid any antitrust liability for regulation of
activities that are traditional municipal functions." Id. at 57.).
Others, citing the dissenting opinion in City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), state that applying such a balancing test to municipal action is impermissible pursuant to certain antitrust principles. See Comment, Alternative Approaches to
Municipal Antitrust Liability, FORDHAM URB. L.J. 51 (1983); Comment, Antitrust: The
Parker Doctrine and Home Rule Muncipalities,22 WASHBURN L.J. 534 (1983). In particular, Justice Rehnquist writing for the dissent in City of Boulder noted that application of
the traditional rule of reason antitrust principle only allows a court to consider the
impact of the defendant's act on competitive conditions, and not the reasonableness of
the practice involved. Accordingly, a municipal ordinance "could not be defended on the
basis that its benefits to the community, in terms of traditional health, safety, and public
welfare concerns, outweigh its anticompetitive effects." 455 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent further stated: "If the Rule of Reason were 'modified' to permit a
municipality to defend its regulation on the basis that its benefits to the community
outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the courts will be called upon to review social legislation in a manner reminiscent of the Lochner era." Id. at 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that analyzing municipal liability for antitrust violations as a preemption problem rather than an exemption analysis will avoid requiring a local government to justify every regulation it enacts in terms of its procompetitive effects, and will
avoid courts reviewing social legislation as in the substantive due process era. Id. at 68.
Under such an analysis, "the federal courts will not be required to engage in a standardless review of the reasonableness of local legislation. Rather the question simply will be
whether the ordinance enacted is pre-empted by the Sherman Act." Id.
83. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48 (citing Posner, supra note 8, at 705); City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 57 n.20.
84. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48 (citing Posner, supra note 8, at 705).
85. Posner, supra note 8, at 705.
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In this article, Posner maintains that states should not have
blanket immunity from antitrust liability as the Court held in
86 Instead, he suggests a special rule of reason defense
Parker.
that a state could assert against antitrust claims which would
87
justify upholding a state regulation against an antitrust attack.
Such a rule differs from the traditional rule of reason which
predicates antitrust liability on whether the challenged activity
is unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.88
The traditional rule of reason does not consider justifications
for a challenged anticompetitive activity.8 9 Instead, it bases
antitrust liability on whether or not an act promotes or suppresses competition. In contrast, a state rule of reason, as proposed by Posner, would consider either the economic or health
and safety justifications for regulating an activity anticompetitively. 90 Posner asserts that such a rule would allow a state "the
opportunity of showing justification either in the sense that
competition would produce undesirable results or in the sense
that a reduction in competition was a necessary condition for the
attainment of other benefits." 91
Posner categorizes potentially exempt regulations as either: (1)
economic regulations or (2) health and safety regulations. Economic regulations should only be upheld against antitrust challenges in two situations based on principles of federalism. 92 The
first situation is public utility regulation of traditionally regulated industries. Posner asserts that regulation in these areas is
"so hallowed by tradition" that it "would be inappropriate... to
change the interpretation of the-Sherman Act to mandate unfettered competition in these industries. '93 The second situation is
86. Id. at 697.
87. Id. at 703-14.
88. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 4,15 U.S. 679, 695-96
(1978). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
89. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
90. Posner, supra note 8, at 707.08. The Court in City of Boulder, after citing the relevant footnote from City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48, invited a comparison between
the holdings in two prior Supreme Court cases. In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978), the Court invalidated a private agreement
which imposed an anticompetitive restraint. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978), the Court held that an anticompetitive effect is an insufficient
basis to strike down a state law. Presumably, the Court invited this comparison between
these two decisions because, like a state law, the fact that a municipal regulation may
have an anticompetitive effect will not be a sufficient reason to strike it down.
91. Posner, supra note 8, at 708 (footnotes omitted).
92. Id. at 709.
93. Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
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state economic regulation which is expressly or implicitly sup9 4
ported by federal legislation outside the antitrust laws.
The second category of permissible anticompetitive regulations,
health and safety regulations, are justified, in Posner's view,
when the economic effects of such regulations are incidental and
the benefits of the regulations cannot be achieved in a less restrictive manner.95 It is essential that the primary purpose and
effect of a regulation is health or safety objectives, otherwise
health or safety reasons could be "used to justify any economic
regulation so long as it can be tacked on to health and safety
96
regulation."
It is apparent that the Supreme Court would not wholly adopt
the special rule of reason approach advocated by Posner if it
extended this possible antitrust defense to municipalities. Posner's
suggestion that there are permissible anticompetitive economic
regulations is premised on federalism principles. However, the
Supreme Court in City of Boulder expressly rejected the establishment of any municipal exception to antitrust liability based
97
on federalism.
The Court would also reject any defense upholding a municipal economic regulation because such a regulation "touches on
the area in which antitrust policy is strongest."98 This consideration was important to the Court's holding in City of Lafayette
that Congress intended to expose municipalities to antitrust liability. There, the Court stated:
If municipalities were free to make economic choices counseled solely by their own parochial interest and without
regard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in
the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at
odds with the comprehensive national policy Congress
established. 99

94. Id. at 709. Two examples Posner cites are the McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(2)-(5)
(1982) (resale price maintenance) and the McCarren-Ferguson Act, Id. §§ 1011-1012

(insurance).
95. Posner, supra note 8, at 714.
96. Id. "A mere recital that health and safety are the primary objects ought not to be
enough if there are substantial effects of the economic regulation variety." Id.
97. 455 U.S. at 54. See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12, reh'g denied,
416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Lincoln County v. Lunig, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
98. Posner, supra note 8, at 708.
99. 435 U.S. at 408 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In this regard, the Court also
stated:
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Similarly, the City of Boulder Court firmly expressed that the
extension of immunity to thousands of local governments, each
with less than state-wide jurisdiction, would subvert the "wisdom
of the longstanding congressional commitment to the policy of
free markets and open competition embodied in the antitrust
laws." 100
Thus, if the Court does recognize a special municipal rule of
reason defense to anticompetitive activity, it most likely will be
one predicated on Posner's second category of exempt regulations, i.e., regulations where the primary purpose of the regulation is to benefit the municipality's residents' health and safety
and any incidental anticompetitive effects are outweighed by
health and safety benefits. Such a weighing would properly balance the goals of the antitrust laws with the needs of a municipality to protect the health and safety of its residents. A municipality is in the best position to know what regulations are
necessary to promote its residents' health and safety. A regulation which has anticompetitive effects should not be struck down
in those situations where the benefits conferred on a local government's residents outweigh the national interest in unfettered
competition.
Legislative Limitations to Antitrust Liability
Recognition of a judicially created defense for municipalities
has not been the only solution suggested for municipal antitrust
liability. Legislation conferring local governmental immunity
from the operation of the antitrust laws has been introduced at
both the state 0 1 and federal levels.

In 1972, there were 62,437 different units of local government in this country ....
These units may, and do, participate in and affect the economic life of this
Nation in a great number and variety of ways. When these bodies act as owners
and providers of services, they are fully capable of aggrandizing other economic
units with which they interrelate, with the potential of serious distortion of the
rational and efficient allocation of resources, and the efficiency of free markets
which the regime of competition embodied in the antitrust laws is thought to
engender.
Id. at 407-08 (footnotes omitted).
100. 455 U.S. at 56 (footnote omitted).
101. The Illinois Antitrust Local Government Act, P.A. 83-929, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv.
5548 (West), attempts to establish a sweeping grant of state action immunity for municipalities under the federal antitrust laws by amending the Illinois Municipal Code as
follows:
It is the policy of this State that all powers granted, either expressly or by
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At the federal level, bills have been introduced in the House of
Representatives proposing broad-based legislation creating an
almost blanket exemption from the federal antitrust laws for
units of local government. 10 2 These bills provide that a local
government is only liable under the antitrust laws for anticompetitive conduct to the same extent that a state would be liable if
it engaged in such conduct. 10 3 A bill containing a narrower
exemption was introduced in the Senate. The Senate bill proposes exemptions for local governmental units to the same extent
that a state government would be exempt from the antitrust
laws, except that a local government would not be exempt for
"any activity involving the sale of goods or services by the unit
4
of government in competition with private persons.

10

necessary implication, by this Code, other Illinois statutes, or the Illinois Constitution to non-home rule municipalities may be exercised by those municipalities notwithstanding effects on competition.
It is further the policy of this State that home-rule municipalities may (1)
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to their government
and affairs or (2) exercise those powers within traditional areas of municipal
activity, except as limited by the Illinois Constitution or a proper limiting statute, notwithstanding effects on competition.
It is the intention of the General Assembly that the "State action exemption"
to the application of federal antitrust statutes be fully available to municipalities to the extent their activities are authorized by law as stated herein.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-1-10 (1983). The Illinois Antitrust Local Government Act also
attempts to give the same immunity to counties, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34,
401 (1983);
county executives, id.
716; townships, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 139,
38 (1983); sanitary
districts, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42, 323 (1983); regional transportation authority, ILL REV.
STAT. ch. 111 2/3, 702.22 (1983); and public school districts, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, 1-4
(1983).
The Illinois Antitrust Local Government Act also amends the Illinois Antitrust Act to
provide that the Illinois Antitrust Act should not be construed to restrict the local
governmental exercise of powers granted expressly or by necessary implication by state
statute or by the state constitution. ILL REV.STAT. ch. 38, 60-11 (1983).
102. H.R. 2981, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). This bill provides interalia:
That a unit of local government shall be liable under the antitrust laws for any
conduct within the authority vested in such a unit by any law only to the extent
that a State, if such State were authorized by any law to engage in identical
conduct, would be liable under the antitrust laws for such identical conduct.
H.R. 3688, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), attempts to amend § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1982), by stating that: "No unit of local government of a State shall be liable
under subsection (a) for conduct which is an exercise of the sovereign power of the State
in which the local government is located."
103. Id.
104. Senate Bill S. 1578, introduced by Senator Thurmond, states:
The Federal antitrust laws shall not apply to any law or other action of, or
official action directed by, a city, village, town, township, county, or other gen-
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Both the Senate and House bills fail to properly balance the
necessary considerations which any legislation on this subject
should take into account. These bills do recognize that consideration must be given to the need of local governments to be able to
conduct their affairs without the fear of treble damages exposure
and the high costs of defending antitrust lawsuits. At the same
time, however, consideration must be given to the national economic policy of free and unfettered competition in the marketplace' 0 5 as well as the states' interest in providing a consistent
approach to the marketplace within their boundaries. 10 6 Local

governmental conduct is not always motiviated by public health,

eral function unit of local government in the exercise of its regulatory powers,
including but not limited to zoning, franchising, licensing, and the establishment of monopoly public services, but excluding any activity involving the sale
of goods or services by the unit of local government in competition with private
persons, where such law or action is valid under State law, except to the extent
that the Federal antitrust laws would apply to a similar law or action of, or
official action directed by, a State.
S. 1578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
105. This economic policy is embodied in the Sherman Act which was described in
this way by Justice Black in Northern Pacific RR. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958):
[A] comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition is the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
Id. at 4. The importance of this policy was similarly underscored by Justice Marshall in
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972):
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection
of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster.
Id. at 610.
These tenets of the Sherman Act are reflected in its legislative history. In the words of
Senator Sherman: "It is the right of every man to work, labor, and produce in any lawful
vocation and to transport his production on equal terms and conditions and under like
circumstances. This is industrial liberty and lies at the foundation of the equality of all
rights and privileges." 21 CONG. REc., 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 2457 (1890).
106. Twenty-three states, including Colorado, joined as amicus curiae in asking the
Supreme Court to deny antitrust immunity to the city of Boulder in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 41-43 (1982). The other 22 states were:
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. See also supra note 99.
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safety and welfare concerns, especially where local governments
may act to increase revenues or return political favors at the
10 7
expense of eliminating the benefits of private competition.
The Senate bill does recognize the importance of national economic policy to some extent by emphasizing that local governments should not enjoy any antitrust immunity when they enter
the marketplace to compete with private enterprises.10 8 However,
even the Senate bill would allow a municipality to pass purely
economic regulations which restrain trade as long as the municipality itself did not compete in that market.10 9 Thus, passage of
this bill by Congress would enable a municipality to freely enact
regulations which are designed to benefit a particular group of
businesses or a certain area of the city at the expense of other
businesses or other areas of the city. 11 0 Further, such an exemption would allow local governments to economically injure other
local governments and businesses by enacting regulations designed to confer advantages on their residents at the expense of
their neighbors."' This type of economic regulation by local
governments inhibits competition and ultimately deprives consumers of the benefits of competition, including lower prices,
higher quality goods and services, and wider choices of selec1 12
tion.
In an effort to give municipalities the freedom to pass necessary legislation without the accompanying fear of antitrust treble damages exposure, these proposed bills give municipalities
too much free reign without considering possible alternatives. If
any of these proposed bills were passed, a businessman could not
even obtain an injunction under the antitrust laws against a
municipality which had passed purely economic legislation benefitting another business at the expense of his business. Such leg-

107. See generally Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1979); Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal

Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969); Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D.
Fla. 1973).
108. See supra note 104.

109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Richmond Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1087 (4th
Cir. 1982) (mayor and city council blocked construction of hotel because of fear that plans
for convention center hotel in another section of city would not be economically feasible if
plaintiff built its hotel).
111. See supranote 99 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See supra
note 105.
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islation goes too far in the direction of protecting municipalities
and as a result fails to fairly balance a municipality's interests
against private competitors' concerns.
A bill recently passed by the House, H.R. 6027,113 which is currently pending before the Senate, does not address municipal
exemptions from antitrust liability. Rather, it prohibits a plaintiff from receiving either monetary relief or attorney's fees from a
municipal government held to have violated the antitrust laws.
This bill provides that a plaintiff can obtain an injunction
against the enforcement of any anticompetitive regulation of a
municipality, as long as the municipality does not qualify for an
exemption from antitrust liability under the Parkerdoctrine.
H.R. 6027 is inadequate because it fails to address those situations where a municipality's acts should not be enjoined.1 1 4 A
municipal exemption from antitrust liability seems appropriate
when a municipal regulation is required for the health and
safety of its residents, although such a regulation has incidental
anticompetitive effects. 1 5 Unfortunately, H.R. 6027 provides that
a plaintiff could under any circumstance obtain an injunction
against enforcement of such a regulation.
Unlike H. R. 6027, the municipal rule of reason defense properly allows local governments to regulate in areas where they
can best serve the needs of their residents-health and safety.
Moreover, the municipal rule of reason defense is not overly
broad in exempting municipalities from antitrust liability as
were some of the earlier bills 1 6 introduced in Congress.
Such a defense properly balances a municipality's need to
enact health and safety regulations to protect its residents with
the economic interests of private competitors. It would not exempt
purely economic municipal regulations 117 and even health and

113. H.R. 6027, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H8623, H8623-24 (daily ed. Aug.
8, 1984). See infra note 222 for the text of H.R. 6027.
114. See 130 CONG. REC. H8475 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Fish)
("Unfortunately, some felt that an immunity bill was more than the situation demanded

and might have prompted years of complicated, interpretive litigation. Consequently, at
this time, I am disposed to accept the so-called remedies approach as a method to address
this serious national problem. Should this legislation prove to be inadequate, I intend to
revisit this subject in the next Congress.").
115. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
116. See supra notes 102-04.
117. The municipal rule of reason would not provide a defense to municipalities for
regulations where the objective is to restrain competition to benefit its residents economi-
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safety objectives would have to be accomplished in a manner
which least restricts competition. Because it is uncertain, however, whether the judiciary will recognize such a defense, it is
submitted that the best solution to the dilemma of municipal
antitrust liability would be enactment of legislation which provides local governments with a rule of reason defense against
antitrust liability. 118
ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGES

Having discussed those situations where municipalities should
not be liable for antitrust violations, this article now addresses
the issue of whether a municipality should be required to pay
treble damages when it is held to have violated the antitrust
laws. A discussion of treble damages liability remains pertinent
even if Congress should enact legislation limiting the imposition
of treble damages awards against municipalities because none of
cally. For instance, a municipality's decision to restrict commercial zoning in one area in
order to promote business activity in another area is a regulation in which the purpose is
to impose an economic restraint. Municipal regulations aimed at acquiring economic
benefits for a group of its residents or all of its residents will most likely be held to violate

the antitrust laws.
118. An example of an anticompetitive municipal act which would qualify for the
municipal rule of reason defense is found in Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas
City, 705 F.2d 1005 (1983). There, the city was charged with violating the antitrust laws
by contracting with a single private operator to provide all ambulance service within the
city. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it found an affirmatively expressed
governmental policy to displace competition in the state statute which authorized cities to
contract with "one or more" operators. Id. at 1011. Based on the language of the statute,
the court held that the state contemplated that a city may contract with only one operator. Id at 1012-13. However, even if the state statute had not expressed such a state policy,
perhaps the court could have predicated nonliability on a health and safety municipal

rule of reason defense.
In Gold Cross Ambulance, Kansas City had provided emergency ambulance service to
its residents by contracting with five competing private companies for emergency ambulance service. In 1978, a controversy arose because of the ambulances' slow response to
emergency calls. A study was conducted by the city which revealed that the fixed costs of
providing emergency ambulance service was high, while the cost of providing nonemergency ambulance service was low. The study also showed that the fee collection rate for
nonemergency service was substantially higher than the fee collection for emergency
services. Thus, the private ambulance services had "a strong incentive to concentrate on
providing nonemergency service rather than quick, high quality emergency care." Id. at
1009.
In response to the problem, the city contracted with a single operator to provide all
ambulance service. The single operator would possess a strong incentive to provide emergency service because it would be paid for its emergency service by the city, whether or
not the city was able to collect payments from the users of the service. Id. However, the
study concluded that for such a system to be economically feasible for the ambulance
service, it had to be the sole provider of such service, otherwise other private ambulance
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the bills proposed by Congress exempt all anticompetitive acts of
local governments from such liability 1 9
MandatoryNature
In City of Lafayette, the Court expressly reserved the issue of
whether treble damages were recoverable against a municipality
found liable for an antitrust violation. 120 The language of section
4 of the Clayton Act indicates that the imposition of treble damages is mandatory once a defendant is held liable for a violation
of the antitrust laws. Section 4 states:
[Any] person who shall be injured in his business or prop-

companies would retain the incentive to provide the high profit nonemergency calls while
leaving the less profitable emergency calls to the city's service. Id.
Clearly, the purpose of the city's anticompetitive activity was to protect the health and
safety of its residents. The anticompetitive effects on the ambulance service industry

were incidental to the benefits of the regulation. Moreover, the study conducted by the
city indicated that the benefits of the regulation could not be achieved in a less restrictive
manner. Therefore, based on a health and safety municipal rule of reason defense, such a
regulation would not leave a city vulnerable to antitrust liability.
Perhaps, such a defense could also have been utilized by the city of Akron in Hybud
Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)

65,536, at 70,114 (N.D. Ohio

1983), where the Court premised state action antitrust immunity on an unwarranted
determination that state policy authorized a municipality to displace competition in the
waste disposal industry. In Hybud, the city was charged with violating the antitrust laws
by requiring that all waste collected within the city limits would be taken to the city's
disposal facilities. The city decided to construct such a facility pursuant to a study conducted to determine a long term solution to its waste disposal problem. The study concluded that existing solid waste disposal sites would be filled by 1978. Accordingly, the
city decided to build a waste treatment facility to solve the problem. Id. at 70,116.
The city sought to issue revenue bonds to finance the project. However, underwriters
refused to repurchase and resell the bonds, finding that the bonds would be unmarketable
unless the disposal facility was assured of receiving a supply of waste that would be of
adequate BTU content over the term of the bonds. Id. at 70,116-17. In order to solve the
long term problem of waste disposal, the city agreed to enact an ordinance requiring that
all the waste collected in the city had to be taken to the city's disposal facilities. Id.
In Hybud, the city's objective in restricting competition in the waste disposal industry
was not economic regulation of the industry, but rather the protection of the health of its
citizens by providing a method of disposing of the town's waste. Furthermore, it appears
that the city could not achieve a less restrictive method of obtaining the benefit of adequate waste disposal. Under such circumstances, a municipality should not be held liable
for antitrust violations.
119. See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text. See also HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 2d SESS., REPORT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST ACT OF 1984

(Comm. Print 1984), reprintedin 47 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at 345 (Aug. 16,

1984) [hereinafter cited as COMM. REPORT].
120. 435 U.S. at 401-02. See also City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56-57 n.20 ("[A]s in City
of Lafayette, ...we do not confront the issue of remedies appropriate against municipal
officials.').
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erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
121
reasonable attorney's fee.
The dissent in City of Boulder, concerned with the impact that
treble damages awards would have on the decision-making processes of municipalities, noted that such damages are mandatory and stated that it would "take a considerable feat of judicial
gymnastics to conclude that municipalities are not subject to
treble damages."' 22 A district court has reached the same conclusion. In Grason Electric Co. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility
District,123 the court held that treble damages were recoverable
against a municipality for its antitrust violations. In doing so,
the court stated: "No. . .room for maneuver exists with respect
to the Clayton Act. Section 4 explicitly mandates the award of
treble damages without respect to the status or identity of the
wrongdoer. This Court is without the power to rewrite section 4
1 24
of the Clayton Act."'
Contrary to the court's reasoning in Grason Electric and the
dissent's statement in City of Boulder, the apparent mandatory
language of section 4 does not require the imposition of treble
damages in all cases. In the past, courts have interpreted the
meaning of statutes contrary to what their literal reading sug125
gests. For example, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown
held that states were exempt from antitrust liability, despite the
fact that a literal reading of the antitrust statutes would indicate
otherwise. One year before Parker v. Brown was decided, the
Court in Georgia v. Evans126 stated that states could sue under
the antitrust laws because they were "persons" under the Act.
Thus, a literal application of the liability provisions of the antitrust laws would subject states to liability as "persons" under the
Act. 27 Nevertheless, the Court in Parker,although recognizing
that states were persons under the antitrust laws, ascertained

121. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
122. 455 U.S. at 65 n.2.
123. 526 F. Supp. 276 (1981).
124. Id. at 282.
125. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
126. 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942).
127. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 397 ("Although both Chattanooga Foundry
and Georgia v. Evans involved the public bodies as plaintiffs, whereas petitioners in the
instant case are defendants to a counterclaim, the basis of those decisions plainly pre-
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that states were not liable under those laws in light of the legislative history of the antitrust laws and certain policy considerations. 12 8 Similarly, the Court in City of Lafayette stated that if
the defendant city was to be successful in its assertion that
municipalities were not liable under the antitrust laws because of
their status as local governments, such a conclusion "must rest
on the impact of some overridingpublic policy which negates the
construction of coverage, and not upon a reading of 'person' or
'persons' as not including them."'129
The Court in City of Lafayette stated that the mandatory language of section 4 of the Clayton Act does not automatically
require awarding treble damages against municipalities. In this
regard, the Court stated that the imposition of antitrust liability
does not "necessarilyrequire the conclusion that remedies appropriate to redress violations by private corporations would be
equally appropriate for municipalities.' 130 Presumably, the Court
left open the possibility that an examination of the legislative
history of the antitrust laws and overriding policy considerations
might negate the apparent mandatory language of section 4.
The legislative history of the antitrust laws interpreted against
the backdrop of common law principles and coupled with policy
considerations could provide a court with the opportunity to limit
treble damages recoveries against local governments. The Court
utilized this type of analysis in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 31 where it held that municipalities are not liable for punitive damages under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The
Court predicated its decision on public policy grounds and the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act. The Court, pursuant to
public policy, found that neither the retributive or deterrent
objectives of punitive damages are advanced by holding municipalities liable for such damages. 32 Furthermore, the Court observed that common law courts refused to award punitive damages against municipalities, 133 and that nothing in the legis-

cludes a reading of 'person' or 'persons' to include municipal utility operators that sue as
plaintiffs but not to include such municipal operators when sued as defendants.").
128. 317 U.S. at 351-52.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

435 U.S. at 397 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
Id. at 266-71.
Id. at 259-63.
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lative history of the Civil Rights Act indicated that Congress
intended to abolish the doctrine of municipal immunity from
34
punitive damages.
Similarly, municipalities which violate the antitrust laws may
assert that public policy considerations and the legislative history of the antitrust laws support the conclusion that municipalities should not be liable for punitive damages in the nature of
treble damages. Whether such an argument would be successful
depends on whether treble damages assessed against municipalities are punitive or compensatory in nature; whether municipalities were exempt from punitive damages at common law at
the time the antitrust laws were enacted; and whether overriding policy considerations exist that would negate applying the
literal wording of the treble damages provision against municipal defendants.
Treble Damages: Punitive or Compensatory?
The Supreme Court in American Society of MechanicalEngineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.135 stated that the treble damages
provision of the antitrust laws serves three principal functions:
(1) punishing past violations of the antitrust laws; (2) deterring
future antitrust violations; and (3) serving as a remedy for victims of antitrust violations. Punishment and deterrence are the
principle functions of punitive damages. 36 In Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he very idea of [antitrust] treble damages reveals an intent
to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct. ' '1 37
Moreover, the Supreme Court has also stated that an important
reason Congress created a private right of action for an antitrust
violation was to promote private enforcement of the antitrust
laws and thereby deter violations. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
the Court stated that: "Congress created the treble damages
remedy... precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the
Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deter-

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 26366.
456 U.S. 556 (1982).
Id. at 575.
451 U.S. 630,639 (1981).
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ring violations."' 138
Although the treble damages provision does serve the important functions of punishment and deterrence, the Supreme Court
in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.139 stated that
Congress created this provision primarily as a remedy for antitrust violations. The Court drew this conclusion from an examination of the legislative history of section 7 of the Sherman Act,
which was the original antitrust treble damages provision, and
section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Court cited statements made by
members of Congress during the House and Senate debates concerning the enactment of the antitrust treble damages provisions
140
in support of its conclusion.
The Court cited two statements made during the House debates concerning section 4 of the Clayton Act which refer to
section 4 as a "remedy" and as providing "ample damages," to
support the proposition that treble damages were created primarily as a remedy. 14 ' However, the Court conceded that statements made by sponsors of the bill indicate that they recognized "treble-damages suits as an important means of enforcing
the law."'1 42 The Court also observed that during the Senate
debates concerning section 4 there was no discussion of the
enforcement value of private actions which serve to promote the
public good by deterring violations. 143 However, neither does
the Court indicate that there was any discussion by the Senate
144
regarding the compensatory value of treble damages.
The Court in Brunswick also referred to statements made during the Senate debates concerning the passage of section 7 of the
Sherman Act, which it found to support the view that antitrust
treble damages are primarily remedial. 145 The Court quoted
Senator George's comment that the treble damages provision
was created as a remedy for people as individuals. 46 However,

138. 442 U.S. 330,384 (1979) (emphasis in original).
139. 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977).
140. Id. at 486 n.10.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The Court stated: "The discussions of this section on the floor of the Senate indicate that it was conceived of primarily as a remedy, for '[tihe people of the United States
as individuals,' especially consumers." Id. (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 1767-68 (1890) (remarks
of Sen. George)).
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in that same speech, Senator George refers to the antitrust statute as "a penal statute, and nothing else.

' 147

The Court also

quoted a statement made by Senator Sherman which indicates
that the reason for including the treble damages provision was
to make the remedy adequate considering the cost of maintaining a private action. 148 Although the statements quoted by the
Court do support the conclusion that the treble damages provision was intended to compensate, they should be examined in
the context in which they were spoken.
Each of the Senators whose remarks were cited by the Court
indicated that he anticipated that in most cases, consumers
would be the parties injured by anticompetitive actions. 149 These
Senators realized that although attorney's fees were recoverable
in antitrust suits, an award of single damages would not even
compensate a consumer plaintiff for the "unrecoverable" expense
of his time and effort in maintaining the lawsuit.150 Therefore,
the Senate supported a bill providing for treble damages so that
it would be worthwhile for consumers to bring antitrust actions.
Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that when a consumer sues for

147. 21 CONG. REc. 1765 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George).
148. The Court stated that treble damages "make the remedy meaningful by counterbalancing 'the difficulty of maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is
described' in the Act." 429 U.S. at 486 n.10 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement
of Sen. Sherman)).
149. 21 CONG. REc. 1767-68 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George) ("The consumer.., is the
party necessarily damnified or injured."); id. at 2612 (remarks of Sen. Teller) (In Senator
Teller's speech which was cited by the Court he argued that the proposed $2,000 jurisdictional amount should be eliminated from the bill and stated: "[I1f we limit the amount
there is not one man out of a hundred who are damaged who will even have an opportunity of getting redress. It may be that there will not be a case prosecuted where there is a
large amount of damage."); id. at 2612 (remarks of Sen. Reagan) ("My reason for presenting this amendment is that under the original bill persons of moderate means would not
be able to go into the Federal courts and employ lawyers and take witnesses there and
prosecute suits, so that, while the bill would nominally afford a remedy for the evils, it
would really be no remedy at all for the great class of persons who might be injured by
the sort of things we are legislating against."); id. at 2615 (remarks of Sen. Coke).
150. Senator George in the same paragraph of his speech quoted in part by the Court
to support the proposition that the treble damages provision was intended to be primarily
remedial, stated:
It is manifest that in nearly every instance the damage by the advanced price
of each article affected by these combinations would be though in the aggregate
large, indeed-so small as not to justify the expense and trouble of a suit in a
distant court. The consumer claims a loss of, say, $25, on a particular article, as
sugar, affected by the combination. If he succeeds he gets double damages; that
is $50. He may live in Missouri, or Texas, or Kansas; he must go to New York,
or Boston, or Chicago, or some distant city to bring his suit. He is poor, a
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twenty-five dollars in actual damages and recovers seventy-five
dollars, the entire award is merely compensating him for his
actual loss resulting from the anticompetitive acts and his time

and effort in maintaining the

suit.151

The Court, however, failed

to recognize that these statements were made in the context of
consumer suits.
It is reasonable to assume that the legislators who viewed the
treble damages provision as a means of adequately compensating a consumer for his trouble in bringing suit for a small sum
would not have considered a treble damages award in the amount
of thousands or millions of dollars as primarily compensatory.
When a business suffers actual damages of one million dollars
as a result of an antitrust violation, it will recover three million
dollars as its treble damages award. The additional two million
dollars cannot be said to primarily compensate the plaintiff for
his time and effort in maintaining the suit. The plaintiff can recover attorney's fees in addition to the treble damages award.
Futhermore, the plaintiffs business expense in having its employees prepare for and attend the trial cannot justify categorizing an increased award in the millions of dollars as primarily
compensatory.
Moreover, it cannot be argued that a strict burden of proof of
damages makes huge treble damages awards primarily compensatory. Courts are liberal in the evidence they accept as proof of
a plaintiff's actual damages in antitrust cases. 15 2 In the vast

farmer, or mechanic, or laborer. He undertakes to get damages from a powerful
and rich corporation, or combination of corporations and persons. He must
employ lawyers; he must hunt up and interview witnesses, many of them unwilling to communicate what they know and some interested in misleading him.

He must summon them; pay their expenses. He must attend the court. If he is
ready for trial the cause will be probably continued. The result will be in nearly
every case that, crushed by the expense, wearied by the delays, he will abandon
the suit in dispair.
I do not hesitate to say that few, if any, of such suits will ever be instituted,
and not one will ever be successful.
Id. at 1768 (remarks of Sen. George). See also id. at 2610 (remarks of Sen. Morgan); id. at
2612 (remarks of Sen. Reagan).
It is interesting to note that although the Supreme Court quotes Senator George as
strong support for its conclusion that treble damages are primarily remedial, Senator
George stated that the antitrust statute is "a penal statute, and nothing else." Id. at 1765
(emphasis added). Moreover, Senator George twice refers to the treble damages provision
as a "penalty provision." Id. at 1767-68.
151. See supra note 150.
152. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); National Wrestling
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majority of antitrust cases where a municipality is a defendant,
the plaintiff will be an injured business where the treble damages awards cannot fairly be categorized as being primarily
compensatory. 153 On the contrary, it appears that in an antitrust
case where a business brings suit, the combined deterrent and
retributive functions of treble damages awards are of greater
importance, than the remedial aspect of treble damages.
Although the Supreme Court's reasoning in Brunswick that
the primary purpose of the antitrust treble damages provision is
to compensate the plaintiff appears unpersuasive, the Court reiterated this finding in American Society of Engineers, Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp. 5 4 In Hydrolevel, the Court resolved the issue
of whether a court could employ apparent authority to impose
treble damages upon a principal for the anticompetitive acts of
its agents. The defendants argued that treble damages were
designed to punish and that under traditional agency law, a
155
court could impose no such liability.
The Court recognized that this traditional agency principle
was premised on the theory that a principal should not be punished for the unauthorized acts of its agents. 156 However, the
Court observed that punishment was only one function that
antitrust treble damages were intended to serve. 15 7 The Court
stated that treble damages were designed to accomplish three
distinct functions:
It is true that antitrust treble damages were designed in
part to punish past violations of the antitrust laws. But
treble damages were also designed to deter future antitrust violations. Moreover, the antitrust private action
was created primarily as a remedy for the victims of antitrust violations. Treble damages "make the remedy meaningful by counterbalancing 'the difficulty of maintaining
a private suit"' under the antitrust laws. 158
The Court stated that two of the purposes underlying the treble
damages provision - compensation and deterrence - would not
Alliance v. Meyers, 325 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1963). See also J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRusT
LAWS & TRADE REGUALTION § 115.01 (1983).

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See, e.g., supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
456 U.S. 556 (1982).
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 575.
Id. (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 486 n.10 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890)

(remarks of Sen. Sherman))) (other citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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be furthered by exempting a principal from the unauthorized
acts of its agent. 5 9 First, it noted that holding a principal liable
on an apparent authority basis would serve the remedial function of treble damages. Second, the Court stated that the deterrent purpose of treble damages would be furthered by holding
the defendant liable. In this regard, the Court reasoned that a
principal is in the best position to control its agents and prevent
future violations. 60 Accordingly, although a principal should
not be punished for the unauthorized acts of its agents, the Court
concluded that "[s]ince treble damages serve as a means of
deterring antitrust violations and of compensating victims, it is
in accord with both the purposes of the antitrust laws and principles of agency law to hold [the defendant] liable for the acts of
agents committed with apparent authority."' 161
The decision in Hydrolevel shows that the compensatory and
deterrent functions of treble damages outweigh the retributive
value of such damages, and that when the former two purposes
are served, the imposition of treble damages is justified. However, this does not preclude a determination that the combined
deterrent and retributive functions outweigh the remedial component of treble damages. 16 2 Because deterrence and punishment
are the objectives of punitive damages, it can be argued that if
these two functions of treble damages outweigh the remedial
aspect of such damages, then a treble damages award could be
classified as primarily punitive, and that when only the remedial
159. Id. at 575-76.
160. Id. at 576. The Court stated:
[I]f... [the defendant] is civilly liable for the antitrust violations of its agents
acting with apparent authority, it is much more likely that similar antitrust
violations will not occur in the future. "[Piressure [will be] brought on [the
organization] to see to it that [its] agents abide by the law." Only [the defendant] can take systematic steps to make improper conduct on the part of all its
agents unlikely, and the possibility of civil liability will inevitably-be a powerful
incentive for [the defendant] to take those steps.
Id. at 572 (quoting United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958) (footnote
omitted).Compare infra note 211 and accompanying text.

161.

456 U.S. at 575-76. To support this conclusion, the Court cited the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217, comment c, at 474 (1957), as providing that the "rule limiting
principal's liability for punitive damages does not apply to special statutes giving triple
damages." 456 U.S. at 576. However, comment c provides in full: "The rule stated in this
Section does not apply to the interpretation of special statutes such as those giving triple
damages, as to which no statement is made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217,
comment c, at 474 (1957) (emphasis added).
162. Although the Court has concluded that treble damages are primarily remedial,
this is not the equivalent of a determination that the majority of such damages are

remedial.

Loyola University Law Journal

678

[Vol. 15

function of treble damages is served, imposition of such an
award is not justified.
If such a determination were made, it would be in the context
of a case where the Court found that neither the deterrent or
retributive functions of treble damages would be served by
imposing multiple damages against a defendant. Such a case is
presented when an antitrust defendant is a municipality. As will
be discussed, the rationale for not imposing punitive damages on
a municipality for the acts of its officials is twofold. First, a
municipality should not be punished for the acts of its agents. 163
Second, unlike the normal principal-agent relationship, the
deterrent function of punitive damages is not furthered by
164
imposing such damages on a municipality.
Accordingly, the remedial component of treble damages does
not necessarily preclude a municipality from successfully arguing that it is exempt from treble damages liability based on
common law principles of punitive damages, the legislative history of the antitrust laws, and policy considerations. Rather, the
remedial aspect of treble damages is a factor to consider when
balancing policy considerations in determining whether to impose
treble damages against municipalities. The analysis utilized in
determining whether a municipality may be exempt from treble
damages liability closely parallels the Court's analysis in City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.165 Accordingly, this case will be
discussed in detail.
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,Inc.
In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,166 the Court held

It is interesting to note that the House Committee on the Judiciary in its report on H.R.
6027 refers to the treble damages provision as punitive in nature. See COMM. REPORT,
supra note 119, at 348 wherein it is stated: "[Sihifting the burden of the punitive damages
award (in the form of threefold damages) from the local officials to the 'innocent' tax
payers-{is] a most misdirected and inequitable result." The report also states that "at a
minimum, the record supports legislation that will remove the punitive aspect from antitrust suits." Id. Following this statement, the report cites to the City of Newport decision.
In addition, when Congress amended the Clayton Act in 1980 to provide for prejudgment interest, it limited such interest to the "actual damages" portion of the award. Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 4(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1156 (1980) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 15 (a)(1982)). Presumably, Congress believed that only the actual damages portion of the award served a compensatory function.
163. See notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
164. See notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
165. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).

166.

Id.
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that local governments could not be held liable for punitive
damages under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 167 Three
years earlier, the Court in Monell v. New York City Department
of Social Services,168 expanded the scope of municipal liability
under the Civil Rights Act and held for the first time that local
governmental units were "persons" for purposes of section 1983
actions. After the decision in Monell, the Court in City of Newport was faced with the issue of whether punitive damages, traditionally available in section 1983 actions, were recoverable
against municipal defendants.
The City of Newport Court utilized a two-step approach to
determine whether municipalities should be subject to punitive
damages. The Court assumed that when Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, its members were familiar with common law principles such as defenses previously recognized in
tort claims. 169 Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress
intended common law immunity defenses to apply to the Civil
Rights Act, unless there were specific provisions of the Act
which indicated otherwise.1 70 At the same time, the Court stated
that congressional intent to incorporate a particular common
law immunity into the Civil Rights Act could not be determined
solely by examining the language of the statute and its legislative history. To do so, in the Court's view, would negate the
intent of Congress to create a new federal remedy.17' Accordingly, the Court stated it would also consider the policies that the
1 72
municipal immunity serves and its compatibility with the Act.
Therefore, to determine whether municipalities were immune
from punitive damages under section 1983, the court examined
both the history of the Act and the policy reasons underlying
such an immunity.
First, the Court examined the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act against the backdrop of the common law. The Court
stated that in 1871, when the Civil Rights Act was enacted,
courts were virtually unanimous in refusing to award punitive

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

42 U.S.C § 1983 (1982).
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
453 U.S. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 259.
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damages against a municipal corporation. 173 Furthermore, the
Court noted that "[judicial disinclination to award punitive

damages against a municipality has persisted to the present day

173. Id. at 259-260. The Court then cited cases that explained the rationale behind
holding municipalities immune from punitive damages. For instance, in McGary v. President & Council of the City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668 (La. 1846), the court refused to award
punitive damages against the city of Lafayette, although municipal officers had directed
the demolition of the plaintiffs house despite an injunction forbidding such action. The
court found that innocent taxpayers should not bear the burden of paying punitive damages because of the wrongdoing of city officials. The Court in City of Newport quoted the
following portion of the McGary decision:
Those who violate the laws of their country, disregard the authority of courts of
justice, and wantonly inflict injuries, certainly become thereby obnoxious to
vindictive damages. These, however, can never be allowed against the innocent.
Those which the plaintiff has recovered in the present case ....being evidently
vindictive, cannot, in our opinion, be sanctioned by this court, as they are to be
borne by widows, orphans, aged men and women, and strangers, who, admitting that they must repair the injury inflicted by the Mayor on the plaintiff,
cannot be bound beyond that amount, which will be sufficient for her
indemnification.
453 U.S. at 261 (quoting McGary, 12 Rob. at 677). Another common law case the Court
cited was the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65 Mo. 620
(1877). In Hunt, the court held that a municipality could not be held liable for treble
damages under a trespass statute, although the statute authorized damages against "any
person." The Court in City of Newport quoted the following portion of the Hunt decision:
[T]he relation which the officers of a municipal corporation sustain toward the
citizens thereof for whom they act, is not in all respects identical with that
existing between the stockholders of a private corporation and their agents; and
there is not the same reason for holding municipal corporations, engaged in the
performance of acts for the public benefit, liable for the willful or malicious acts
of its officers, as there is in the case of private corporations.
453 U.S. at 261-62 (quoting Hunt, 65 Mo. at 625).
Hunt is a significant decision in another respect. The Court in City of Newport stated:
"The general rule today is that no punitive damages are allowed unless expressly authorized by statute." Id. at 260 n.21. This rule was derived from early common law decisions
such as Hunt, which held that although a local government is a "person" under an applicable statute which authorized awarding punitive damages against "persons," the statute must specifically authorize the award of punitive damages against local governments
for it to be held liable for such an award. For a discussion of these decisions, see Annot.,
19 A.LR.2d 903, § 6, at 912-13 (1950) (discussion of the effect of a statute on the recovery
of punitive damages from a municipal corporation). Such decisions negate the argument
that the Court's reasoning in City of Newport cannot be analogized to the imposition of
antitrust treble damages awards against municipalities because 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)
expressly authorizes treble damages while 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) does not expressly
authorize punitive damages.
After reviewing certain common law decisions involving a local government's liability
for punitive damages, the Court in City of Newport stated that the rationale of these
decisions was enunciated in numerous common law jurisdictions, where courts reasoned
that punitive damages were against public policy because they burdened the same taxpayers for whose benefit such damages would be exacted. 453 U.S. at 263. While the
obligation to pay compensatory damages was properly shared by the public for a city

19841

Local Governments and Antitrust

in the vast majority of jurisdictions."' 174 After concluding that a
municipality's immunity from punitive damages was firmly established at common law, the Court examined the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act and ascertained that there was no
indication that Congress intended to abolish the doctrine of
municipal immunity from punitive damages. 175
Therefore, the Court proceeded to determine whether the policy
considerations behind the municipal immunity were compatible
with the Civil Rights Act. The Court stated that punitive damages are not designed to compensate the injured party. Rather,
the primary functions of punitive damages are to punish the
wrongdoer for his actions and to deter him from committing simi176
lar violations in the future.
The Court maintained that assessing punitive damages against
a municipality would punish taxpayers who were not involved in
the commission of the tort. 177 Furthermore, because the punishment is not intended to compensate, the issue of equitably distributing the losses resulting from misconduct by city officials is
not involved. 178 Rather, such damages are a windfall to the
plaintiff, while they are "likely accompanied by an increase in
taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the
bill. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution
should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing
79
taxpayers."'
The Court also considered the deterrent function of punitive
damages. The plaintiffs argued that a primary purpose of section 1983 was deterrence, and that awarding punitive damages

official's wrongful acts the public should not be subjected to unjust punishment nor
should municipalities suffer "undue fiscal restraints." Id.
174. 453 U.S. at 260. The Court cited the following cases in support of its conclusion:
Lauer v. Young Men's Christian Assoc., 57 Haw. 390, 557 P.2d 1334 (1976); Ranells v.
City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975); Smith v. District of Columbia,
336 A.2d 831 (D.C. App. 1975); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Brown

v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952); Town of Newton v. Wilson, 128
Miss. 726, 91 So. 419 (1922); Willett v. Village of St. Albans, 69 Vt. 330, 38 A. 72 (1897).
175. 453 U.S. at 263-66.
176. Id. at 266-67. See also 25 C.J.S. Damages§ 117, at 1107-09 ("[Sluch Jamages are
allowed not because of any special merit in the injured party's case, but are awarded by
way of punishment to the offender, and as a deterrent, warning, or example to defendant

and others.').
177. 453 U.S. at 267.
178.

Id.

179. Id. (footnote omitted).
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against a municipality for the malicious acts of its officials
would cause voters to oust the responsible officials from office,
thereby deterring future violations.180 The Court recognized that
deterrence of future civil rights violations is an important purpose of section 1983.181 However, the Court concluded for a
number of reasons that such a purpose would not be served if
punitive damages were assessed against a municipality.
First, the Court stated that it is arguable that municipal officials would be deterred from wrongdoing based on their knowledge that large punitive damages awards may be assessed for
civil rights violations because of the wealth of their municipality.18 2 In this regard, the Court noted that municipalities may not
be allowed to seek indemnification against the officials responsible for the wrongdoing.18 3 Even if indemnification was available, the Court stated it was unlikely that such officials could
pay the sizable awards.18 4 Second, the Court maintained that
there was no reason to assume that corrective action would not
be taken against wrongdoers in the absence of punitive damages. The Court stated that "the more reasonable assumption is
that responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for
18 5
the public but also by concern for the Government's intergrity."'
The Court observed that discharge of appointed officials and
public condemnation of elected officials may well occur without
the imposition of punitive damages. 186 Moreover, the Court noted
that if additional protection against official wrongdoing is
necessary, the electorate may vote such officials out of office
because of the burden imposed on the taxpayers resulting from
the award of compensatory damages against the municipality. 187
Third, the Court stated that the most effective means of deterring official wrongdoing remained available under the Act. The
Court maintained that the best method of deterring future violations was to allow the courts to award punitive damages against
a governmental official based on his own finances.1 88 In this

180.
181.

Id. at 268.
Id.

182.

Id.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 269 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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regard, the Court noted that it had previously found that a damage remedy assessed against an individual is "more effective as
a deterrent than the threat of damages against a government
employer."' 89 The Court observed that the same rationale applied to the threat of damages against the citizen-taxpayer. 190
The Court also stated that there were other policy considerations which weighed against a finding that municipalities are
liable for punitive damages resulting from section 1983 violations. The Court stated that one such reason was that potential
governmental liability under the Civil Rights Act had recently
been expanded. The Court maintained that to add the burden of
punitive damages liability might seriously impair the financial
integrity of governmental entities. 19' The Court found that such
awards may be substantial: "[W]e are sensitive to the possible
strain on local treasuries and therefore on services available to
the public at large."' 92 Because neither the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act nor policy reasons supported subjecting
municipalities to punitive damages, the Court held that municipalities are immune from such awards under section 1983.
Local Government Exemption from Treble Damages
The Court in City of Newport resolved many of the issues that
a court must address in determining whether local governments
are immune from antitrust treble damages. First, a court should
consider the history of the antitrust laws in light of the common
law. Section 7 of the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890.193 Section 4 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 and extended the
scope of activities under which antitrust defendants could be
held liable for treble damages.' 94 A court should assume that
when Congress enacted these provisions, its members were familiar with common law immunity defenses, just as the Court
assumed in City of Newport that Congress was familiar with

189. Id. at 270 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980)).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 271.
193. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (repealed 1955 and superseded by Act
of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731).
194. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)).
Section 4 of the Clayton Act is made applicable to all of the antitrust statutes by § 1 of
the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
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these common law defenses when it enacted the Civil Rights Act
in 1871.195
A court would readily ascertain that the common law at the
time these federal remedies were created did not impose punitive
damages awards against municipalities. The Court in City of
Newport maintained that prior to 1871 and continuing to present
day, a municipal immunity against awarding punitive damages
has been recognized in the vast majority of jurisdictions.196 Therefore, it is presumed that such an immunity was known and recognized by Congress in 1890 and 1914 respectively.
Having established that Congress knew of the common law
municipal immunity from punitive damages, a court should
further assume that Congress intended this common law
immunity defense to apply to the antitrust laws unless there are
specific provisions to the contrary. 197 Such an assumption is
reasonable. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that
the rules of the common law in effect at the time the antitrust
laws were passed are relevant in determining congressional
intent. The Court has stated that there is a permissible inference
that "Congress relied on courts' continuing to apply [common
law] principles in effect at the time of enactment."'198 The Court
has also stated:
Congress... did not intend the text of the Sherman Act
to delineate the full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The legislative history makes
it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape
to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on commonlaw tradition. 99
The legislative history of the antitrust laws reveals that the
members of Congress did not discuss whether municipalities were
exposed or immune from treble damages liability. Therefore,
because neither the legislative history of the Sherman Act nor the
Clayton Act shows that Congress intended to abolish the municipal immunity against punitive damages, it is likely Congress

195. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
198. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 644 n.17 (1981).
199. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
Accord United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 n.14 (1978). See 21
CONG. REC. 2456, 2460 (comments of Sen. Sherman). See generally H. THoRELLI, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST PoLicY 228-29 (1955).
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intended such an immunity to apply in antitrust actions against
municipalities.
A court should also consider that although local governments
are considered "persons" for purposes of substantive antitrust
liability, 20 0 it would not be anomalous for a court to hold that
local governments are not within the scope of section 4 of the
Clayton Act. Because local governments at common law were
-liable for their tortious acts, 20 1 it is not unreasonable to conclude
that there was no need for Congress to specifically state that
local governments were subject to the antitrust laws. 20 2 However,
because it was well established at common law that local governments were exempt from punitive damages, 20 3 it was again unnecessary for Congress to provide a specific exemption for local
governments. The plain understanding of the common law
coupled with the legislative history of the antitrust laws provides
a court with the opportunity to limit damage recoveries against
local governments.
A review of the legislative history of the antitrust laws does
not end the inquiry into whether municipalities are immune
from treble damages liability. Next, a court would have to consider whether the public policies such an immunity serves are
compatible with the goals of the treble damages provision. 20 4 A
court's review of whether public policy requires the imposition of
treble damages on local governments should closely tract the
Supreme Court's City of Newport analysis, with the exception
that a court must further consider that treble damages, unlike
punitive damages, serve a compensatory function. 20 5
The retributive purpose of antitrust treble damages is not
served by awarding such damages against municipalities because the burden of the loss falls on the innocent taxpaying pub-

200. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. See also City of Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 395-97 & nn.10-13.
201. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 259 ("It was generally understood by 1871 that a
municipality, like a private corporation, was to be treated as a natural person subject to
suit for a wide range of tortious activity, but this understanding did not extend to the
award of punitive or exemplary damages.').
202. See Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 634 (1981)
("[C]ourts generally have acknowledged that treble-damages actions under the antitrust
laws are analogous to common-law actions sounding in tort."). See also Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 342-48 (1971).
203. See supra note 201.
204. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 135-65 and accompanying text.
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lic. 20 6

Furthermore, common law courts recognized that assessing punitive damages against local governments was contrary to
public policy because they burden the same taxpayers for whose
benefit such damages would be exacted. 20 7 Courts at common law
also recognized that taxpayers should not be punished because
20 8
often they have little influence on actual city management.
These courts noted that the taxpayers' relationship to the municipal corporation is unlike the relationship between a private corporation and its shareholders because citizens exercise less dominion and control over governmental employees than shareholders
20 9
exercise over the employees of a private corporation.
The deterrent function of treble damages is also not furthered
by imposing such awards against municipalities. The Court in
City of Newport assumed that a city official who is guilty of
wrongdoing would be deterred from committing future violations
of a law by means other than damages assessed against the
local government for his conduct. The Court believed that the
governmental integrity of the wrongdoer's superiors and citizen
condemnation would serve to deter him. 2 10 Moreover, large damages awards, such as antitrust treble damages, would not deter

206. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. For a discussion of McGary v.
President & Council of the City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668 (La. 1846), see supra note 173.
See also Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1952).
207. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 263 ("In general, courts viewed punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy, because such awards would burden the very
taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised."). See also
E. McQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.18(a), at 161-62 (3d rev. ed. 1977); 57 Am.
Jur. 2d Municipal,School, and State Tort Liability § 319, at 268-69 (1971).
208. See E. McQuILLAN, supra note 207, § 53.18(a), at 161; Morris, Punitive Damages
in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L REv. 1173 (1931). See also Costich v. City of Rochester, 68 App.
Div. 623, 73 N.Y.S. 835 (1902) (stating it also unfair to punish taxpayers for the acts of
municipal management because it not always a city government of their choice).
209. See supra note 173 for a discussion of Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65 Mo. 620
(1877); E. MCQuILLAN, supra note 207, § 53.18(a), at 161; 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal,
School, and State Tort Liability § 319, at 269 (1971) ("I]t has also been pointed out that a
municipality always acts through agents, whose acts are not easily subject to the control
of the public, as contrasted to the situation involving a private corporation and its stockholders, and that while the agents should be considered responsible individually for such
damages, the public should not, since they are merely passive wrongdoers."). See also
Costich v. City of Rochester, 68 App. Div. 623, 73 N.Y.S. 835 (1902).
210. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975). Similarly, the court in Fisher v. City of
Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965), stated:
The deterence element likewise adds little justification for this type of award
against a municipality. In the first place it is to be assumed that the municipal
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taxpayers from allowing future antitrust violations to occur.
Taxpayers have little control over city management, so they are
not in a position to institute safeguards to prevent future viola21
tions of the antitrust laws. 1

Treble damages are also intended to promote the enforcement
of the antitrust laws by encouraging private parties to bring suit
and thereby deter violations. However, the alleged actual damages in most antitrust suits filed against municipalities are sufficiently large to promote the continuance of suits without trebling
the damages. Even if actual damages alone did not suffice to
encourage the filing of suits against municipalities, the purpose
underlying the encouragement of private lawsuits would not be
furthered by increasing the damages award. Congress hoped
that treble damages would encourage the bringing of private
lawsuits to aid in the enforcement of the antitrust laws for the
benefit of the public. 212 It would be incongruous to say that the
awarding of treble damages is necessary to encourage private
enforcement for the benefit of the public when the public will
have to ultimately pay the treble damages awards assessed
against local governments. Although a private suit against a
municipality benefits the public because of the favorable effects
that competition has on the price and quality of goods and services in the future, the monetary value of these benefits to the
public would not be great enough to justify the awarding of treble damages as being in the economic interest of the public.
Because of the broad scope of liability under section 1983, the
Court in City of Newport was concerned that large punitive
damages awards would threaten the financial integrity of local
governments.2 1 3 Courts should be equally concerned with the
financial disaster that could result from exposing municipalities
to treble damages under the antitrust laws. 21 4 A municipality
may be faced with antitrust lawsuits for a multitude of activities,
ranging from the operation of electric utility systems to the leas-

officials will do their duty and if discipline of a wrongdoing employee is indicated, appropriate measures will be taken without a punitive award.
Id. at 457. See also E. McQuILLAN, supra note 207, § 53.18(a), at 162.
211. See supra note 209. Compare supra note 160 and accompanying text. See also
COMM. REPORT, supra note 119, at 351.
212. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 16,274-75 (1914) (statements of Rep. Webb); id. at 16,31719 (statements of Rep. Floyd). See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 384 (1979).
213. See supranotes 191-92 and accompanying text. See also Morris, supra note 208.
214. See supranotes 61-66 and accompanying text.
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ing of parking spaces for ballgames. 215
Neither the deterrent nor retributive functions of antitrust treble damages would be served by imposing such liability against
municipalities. The issue remaining is whether the compensatory function of treble damages can be reconciled with not
imposing treble damages against municipalities. In terms of the
remedial function of treble damages, a review of antitrust cases
filed against municipalities reveals that most of the plaintiffs are
businesses. 2 16 In most of these cases, the alleged actual damages
are in the millions of dollars. 217 Because such a plaintiff may
recover attorney's fees 218 and prejudgment interest 21 9 in addition to treble damages, the bulk of the increased damages does
not serve to compensate the plaintiff for its loss. In cases involving millions of dollars in actual damages, the "unrecoverable" cost of maintaining a suit constitutes only a small
fraction of what a plaintiff would eventually recover. A plaintiff
is adequately compensated without the use of treble damages
through the courts' liberal policy regarding proof of antitrust
damages 220 and through its recovery of attorney's fees and, in
certain circumstances, prejudgment interest.
Because the purposes behind the deterrent and retributive
functions of treble damages are not served by imposing antitrust
treble damages liability against local governments, and the
plaintiffs in cases filed against municipalities are usually adequately compensated by actual damages, attorney's fees and prejudgment interest, a court may conclude that the policies underlying a municipality's immunity from punitive damages are
compatible with the goals of the treble damages provision.
Accordingly, public policy and the legislative history of the antitrust laws interpreted in light of common law principles, could
support a finding that municipalities are exempt from antitrust
treble damages liability.
Legislative Response
Although a court could find that the purposes underlying anti-

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
Id.
See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
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trust treble damages are not furthered by assessing these awards
against municipal defendants, one court has already imposed
such damages. 221 Thus, a legislative solution may be necessary
to protect local governments against treble damages liability.
H.R. 6027 addresses the issue of treble damages. This bill was
recently passed by the House. 222 It provides that a plaintiff cannot recover monetary relief when a municipality acts anticompetitively while exercising its regulatory power. 223 One of this
bill's failings is that a plaintiff can always obtain an injunction
224
against enforcement of anticompetitive municipal regulations.
As a result, enforcement of an anticompetitive regulation can be
enjoined even where the primary purpose and effect of the regu-

221. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, No. 81 C 2745 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1984).
222. H.R. 6027, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H8623-24 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1984).
H.R. 6027 provides:
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984".
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 2. For purposes of this Act(1) the term "local government" means a city, county, parish, town, township, village, school district, sanitary district, or any other general or special
purpose political subdivision of one or more states,
(2) the term "official conduct of a local government" means any action or
inaction of a local government, or its officials, employees, or agents, that
such local government, officials, employees, or agents could reasonably have
construed to be within the legislative, regulatory, executive, administrative,
or judicial authority of such local government.
(3) the term "person" has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first
section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), and
(4) the term "State" has the meaning given it in section 4G(2) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15g(2)).
LIMITATION ON MONETARY RELIEF
SEC. 3. (a) Neither the United States nor any person or State may recover
monetary relief for any claim under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, 15c) if(1) the claim is against a local government, or its officials, employees, or
agents, and results from official conduct of a local government, or
(2) the claim is against a person and results from conduct expressly
required by a local government.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to and shall not be construed to affect the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, with respect to any claim
under the Clayton Act filed before July 1, 1984.
H. R 6027, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1984).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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lation serves the health and safety needs of the local govern225
ment's residents.
H.R. 6027 also inadequately treats the damages issue because
limiting a plaintiffs relief to an injunction in all circumstances
fails to balance the antitrust goals that treble damages liability
was intended to serve with the needs of a municipality to enact
regulations without the fear of liability. Antitrust treble damages
have been recognized as serving three purposes: compensating
the plaintiff; deterring future violations; and punishing the
defendant. H.R. 6027 does not punish municipalities for their
anticompetitive acts. This is proper because taxpayers should
not be punished for the wrongdoing of city officials. 226 However,
the bill inadequately serves other purposes of the antitrust laws.
For example, limiting a plaintiff to injunctive relief does not even
attempt to compensate him for his damages. 227 Moreover, third

225. See supranotes 101-18 and accompanying text.
226. See supranotes 206-09 and accompanying text.
227. Immediately prior to the House vote on H.R. 6027, Representative Brooks,
although supporting its passage, advocated that changes in the bill should be made by
the Senate before it voted on the bill. Representative Brooks stated that the bill needed
several changes "to restrict its scope and make it consistent with the traditional
approaches of Congress to antitrust matters." 130 CONG. REc. H8622 (daily ed. Aug. 8,
1984) (statement of Rep. Brooks). One drawback of H.R. 6027, in Representative Brooks'
view, is the elimination of actual damages relief:
I am also concerned with the provisions of the bill which restrict the remedy
for antitrust violations to injunctive relief. I concur that the punitive remedy of
treble damages specified in the antitrust laws is unwarranted when applied to
local governments and their officers. The bill, however, goes beyond the elimination of treble damages to strip the right to actual damages for antitrust
violations.
The elimination of actual, as well as treble, damages has two serious drawbacks. The bill, by providing for injunctive relief recognizes that there is a role
for the antitrust regulation of local governments to ensure proper competition in
local markets. Injunctive relief alone will not provide the incentive for individuals and small businesses, to undertake the massive and protracted litigation
necessary to enforce the antitrust law and achieve our free enterprise goals.
Further, the award of actual damages is a traditional remedy found throughout
the Nation's civil laws. It is based upon a fundamental belief that justice
requires that those who are injured by illegal activity should be allowed to
recoup their loss. In this instance, those who have been the victims of anticompetitive behavior should be paid back their actual loss. The injury is the same
whether it has been caused by a group of individuals acting as a corporation or
through a local government.
I note that in both the Joint Research and Development Act of 1984 and the
Shipping Act of 1983, the committee felt that relief from treble damages under
the antitrust laws was appropriate for certain groups, but that actual damages
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parties acting anticompetitively in concert with a municipality
may be immune from the payment of damages. 228
Deterring local governments from committing antitrust violations would be eliminated by the adoption of this bill. The
Supreme Court in City of Newport observed that the payment of
compensatory damages may be enough to deter future wrongdoing by municipal officials. 2 29 In addition, the Court stated that
the best deterrent against municipal wrongdoing is the imposition of damages against the city officials. 23 0 H.R. 6027 eliminates both these deterrents and also encourages municipalities
and their officials to act anticompetitively. If a plaintiff can only
obtain an injunction against a municipal defendant, the municipality is placed in a fail safe position in enacting any anticompetitive regulation, even a purely economic restraint.
Proponents of H.R. 6027 argue that eliminating deterrence is
necessary, otherwise municipal officials will be discouraged from
enacting regulations which are necessary for the well-being of
local governments' residents. 23 1 However, H.R. 6027's broad-based
exemption of municipal actions from all monetary damages is
232
unnecessary to accomplish this goal.
H.R. 6027 proposes municipal exemption from damages lia-

were retained. This is a sensible and just approach in providing relief when
warranted, but still ensures the effective application of the antitrust laws to
achieve our policy goal of a free and competitive economy.
Id. at H8623 (statement of Rep. Brooks).
228. 130 CONG. REC. H8623 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1984) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
229.

453 U.S. 247, 269 (1981).

230. Id. at 269-70.
231. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Seiberling) ("We must act now to free our local government officials of the burden of antitrust
damage suits so they may govern in the public interest."); id. at H8471 (statements of
Rep. Moorhead); id. at H8473 (statements of Rep. Crane); id. at H8474 (statements of Rep.
Rodino).
232. H.R. 6027 was voted on by the House under an expedited process, which some
representatives thought may have left members of the House with insufficient time to
consider possible ramifications which would result if it is enacted. See 130 CONG. REC.
H8623 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1984):
Because this bill has been processed so rapidly from the Judiciary Committee's
adoption last week, I do not believe my colleagues have had the opportunity to
closely examine the bill to discover its deficiencies. Unfortunately, the bill is
being considered under suspension of the rules and amendments cannot be
offered to correct them. I strongly urge the Senate to carefully examine this
legislation when it is reviewed there.
Id. (statement of Rep. Brooks); 130 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1984) (statement

of Rep. Erlenborn) ("I . .. think that this bill coming up under these circumstances is
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bility for any action which the local government reasonably construes to be within its legislative or regulatory authority. This
exemption is very broad. For example, in the case of a home-rule
municipality, this authority would include any activity which a
state could regulate - in other words, any area not pre-empted
by Congress. This legislation does not distinguish between anticompetitive regulations which are enacted for public health and
safety purposes, and thus are necessary for the well-being of a
municipality's residents, and regulations which are enacted to
benefit a particular group of businesses or are simply intended to
raise revenue. In those situations where a regulation is enacted
for purposes other than providing for the well-being of a municipality's residents, there is no justification for not compensating
the injured party for his actual damages and attempting to deter
future violations.
Monetary damages liability under the antitrust laws was also
designed to encourage private parties to bring suit, which would
benefit the public and deter violations. However, the private
enforcement value that such damages were designed to further
would be eliminated if H.R. 6027 becomes law. This bill not only
precludes the recovery of actual damages, it also precludes recovery of attorney's fees. Few businesses could afford to bring
antitrust suits against municipalities under these circumstances.
The economic value of possibly obtaining an injunction may not
be worth the heavy cost of maintaining an antitrust suit.
Although the public interest would not be economically served
by imposing treble damages against a municipality and ultimately the public, the long term effects of lower prices and
improved quality of goods or services could economically justify
allowing recovery of some lesser award such as single damages
and reasonable attorney's fees to encourage the bringing of pri233
vate lawsuits for the public's benefit.

moving a bit too fast for Members really to know what it is they are being asked to do.").
233. The House Committee on the Judiciary noted the beneficial effects of lawsuits
brought against municipalities for antitrust violations:
Others view the "public interest" as being equally at risk when a municipal
action has the effect of diminishing the availability of products and services,
lifting prices, or favoring some business interests over others. It is asserted that
immunizing local government units under the antitrust laws would create very
strong incentives for the establishment of additional local boards and commissions to set fees, prices, or rates and to establish location, customer or other
restrictions in various professions and industries. With substantial segments of
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For these reasons, legislation dealing with municipal antitrust

liability should provide that actual damages and reasonable
attorney's fees are recoverable when a municipality cannot show
that the primary purpose of its anticompetitive regulation is to
protect the health and safety of its residents. This legislation
would promote the goals of the antitrust laws by properly compensating a plaintiff for his actual damages 234 and deterring
future antitrust violations, while at the same time eliminating

the potential crippling effects local governments would suffer by
paying treble damages awards. Such legislation should further
provide that when a municipal regulation's primary purpose is
health or safety, neither actual damages nor injunctive relief are
235
available to the plaintiff.

the economy thus immune from antitrust scrutiny, consumers would be deprived
of the benefits of competition.
COMM. REPORT, supra note 119, at 347.
234. The House Subcommittee considered allowing the recovery of actual damages,
but rejected this approach because of the "conceptual difficulties" in determining when a
local government can avail itself of the state action doctrine:
The Subcommittee considered permitting actual damage recovery by private
persons injured by local governmental actions. Allowing actual damage recovery would accomplish the purpose of compensation for injury suffered. Reduction of damage exposure to actual damages might also remove the fundamental
pressure for complete municipal antitrust immunity at this time. Certainly, if a
municipality has gained financially by an antitrust violation, then it should
have the funds to make restitution to the injured party. If those funds have
been disbursed by the municipality for the benefit of its constituents, then it
may not be unjust to require additional taxes in the future to provide compensation owed the victim.
The Subcommittee was persuaded, however, that the most balanced legislative response at this time would be to restrict private remedies to injunctive
relief. Certainly, such an approach avoids the conceptual difficulties of the state
action doctrine in determining whether a damage remedy is available. This
type of legislation should therefore not increase antitrust litigation for local
governments.
COMM. REPORT, supra note 119, at 350.
235. Proposals were made at the House Subcommittee Hearings to consider a legislative municipal rule of reason defense which would balance the local government's interests with private competitors' concerns. See COMM. REPORT, supra note 119, at 349. Professor Thomas Campbell testifying at the hearings advocated such a test:
When a court is presented with a restriction on competition, the Court would
engage in a less restrictive alternative analysis . . . [which would] simply
require the court to ask, could the unit of local government have achieved its
safety, its health, its public welfare objective in a way less restrictive of the
Federal interest in competition, less harmful to the consumer.
Id. at 349-50. Local officials conceded such a rule would be an improvement over existing
law, but expressed reservations whether such a rule would be enough to return "certainty
to local planning and decisionmaking." Id. The House Committee on the Judiciary also
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CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court may accept a special antitrust
defense for municipalities and may limit awards against municipalities to actual damages, municipalities rightfully remain
uncertain about their antitrust liability, given recent lower court
decisions. 236 Amendments to the antitrust laws are needed which

noted that H.R. 5992 provided a similar local government exemption to the antitrust laws
because the laws would not apply to official conduct of a local government "reasonably
undertaken to protect or provide for the public health, safety, or welfare." Id. This bill
was criticized because "it is unclear as to what kind of evidentiary showing would be
required by courts in sustaining a local government's action as being reasonably under-

taken." Id. Because the municipal rule of reason test runs the risk of "uncertain application by the courts," the remedy approach enunciated in H.R. 6027 was advocated. Id.
236. Because of the potentially devastating consequences of awarding antitrust treble
damages against municipalities, some courts appear to have avoided imposing antitrust
liability on municipalities by exempting them under the Parker doctrine where such
exemptions were unwarranted in light of the test articulated in City of Lafayette and
City of Boulder.
In Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste
Agency, 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983), pursuant to state law, a municipal consortium constructed and operated a solid waste disposal site and issued revenue bonds to fund its
construction. In the bond contract, however, the consortium agreed to require that participating municipalities refuse to grant any licenses to competing waste disposal facilities.
This exclusivity privilege was alleged to be a violation of the antitrust laws.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit admitted that the state statute authorizing
the creation of waste disposal facilities did not expressly indicate that the legislature
contemplated the displacement of competition in the waste disposal industry. Id. at 426.
Nevertheless, the court stated that such contemplation by the state legislature could be
inferred from the presence of three factors. First, the court noted that government agencies engaged in the disposal of solid waste was a "high priority" of the state and accordingly the state legislature authorized those activities that were necessary to insure the
waste disposal's success. Id. Second, the court stated that the legislature affirmatively
addressed the subject of waste disposal by authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds for
the purpose of constructing waste disposal facilities. The court maintained that the
state's treatment of the issue was greater than the Colorado legislature's neutral stance
regarding the anticompetitive franchising of cable television found in City of Boulder. Id.
at 426-27. Third, the court stated that because the legislature authorized the issuance of
revenue bonds, it must have intended that the bonds restrict competition if that was
necessary to insure their. sale. Id. at 427. Accordingly, the court held that such anticompetitive activity was immune under the antitrust laws.
The court broadly interpreted the requirement that the state must contemplate the
anticompetitive activities of a municipality in order for it to qualify for immunity under
the Parkerdoctrine. First, whether or not an activity is a high priority of the state legislature has no relationship to whether or not the legislature contemplated that such activity
would be conducted anticompetitively. Second, the state legislature's broad addressing of
the subject matter of waste disposal facilities does not reflect a clear articulation and
affirmative expression of the legislature's intent to displace competition in that area.
Such a broad addressing of the subject matter by the state more likely indicates that the
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would exempt municipalities from liability when they act primarily to benefit the public's health, safety and welfare. In addition, legislation should limit damages awards against municipalities to actual damages because this would properly serve the
goals of the antitrust laws without unnecessarily burdening
innocent taxpayers.
Until such legislation or judicial action is taken, counsel for
local governments can help avoid potential lawsuits and bolster
antitrust compliance by becoming familiar with the antitrust
laws. Further, local governments can band together to provide
self-insurance or purchase insurance against antitrust liability,
attorney's fees, and the cost of hiring private counsel to defend

legislature's stance on anticompetitive activities in this area was neutral. Third, the state
legislature's authorization of the issuance of revenue bonds does not indicate that the
legislature contemplated anticompetitive restrictions on such an issuance to insure successful sale of the bonds.
Finding an exemption under these circumstances is a misapplication of the test articulated in City of Lafayette and City of Boulder to determine whether a municipality is
immune from liability under the Parkerdoctrine. City of Lafayette and City of Boulder
require that the state not only authorize a municipality to act in a particular area, but
that it also contemplate the anticompetitive acts undertaken by the municipality. Similarly, in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,536, at
70,114 (N.D. Ohio 1983) the court held that a city was immune from antitrust liability
under the state action doctrine even though there was no indication that the legislature
contemplated anticompetitive acts by a municipality in an area in which the state authorized it to act.
In Hybud, the plaintiffs sought relief from an ordinance enacted by the city of Akron
that required all solid waste collected within the city limits to be brought to the city's own
disposal and recycling plant. The court observed that Ohio had established a state development agency with broad authority to finance waste facilities and to enter into cooperative agreements with municipalities "with a view to effective cooperative action and
safeguardingof the respective interests of the parties." Id. at 70,122 (quoting OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 6123.13 (Page Supp. 1981)). In addition, the statute empowered the agency to
do all acts necessary or proper to carry out its express powers. Id. From this broad grant
of authority, the court concluded that the legislature must have contemplated the use of
anticompetitive acts by the state agency and municipalities. In so concluding, the court
failed to note the distinction between a municipality's power to enact a law and a municipality's authority to use that power anticompetitively.
In Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that a municipality was immune from antitrust liability for anticompetitive activities under the prong of the City of Lafayette and
City of Boulder test which exempts anticompetitive activities engaged in by a municipality as a result of a direction by the state to so act. In Peublo, the city operated a municipal
airport and granted leases to "fixed based operators" who operated their businesses on
specific portions of airport land. The lease agreements required the fixed based operators
to purchase all their aviation fuel from the city. A fixed based operator charged that this
agreement violated the antitrust laws.
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their antitrust litigation. Under appropriate circumstances, a
local government may be able to contract with and authorize a
state attorney general's office to undertake the defense of the litigation. In addition, local governments may enter into indemnification agreements with parties selected as winning bidders in
the provision of city services and supplies. The winning bidders
would agree to indemnify the local government from any lawsuits or claims resulting from the rejection of other bidders.
Finally, municipalities should encourage their state legislatures
to pass legislation which would qualify the municipalities for an
exemption under the Parker doctrine for those areas which constitute traditional governmental functions.

The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs contention. It based its decision on a
state statute that authorized the city to operate a municipal airport and stated that such
operation was a governmental function, exercised for a public purpose. Id. at 808. The
court viewed this statute as granting the city some of the powers of the state to operate
the airport for the public good. In the court's view, the city of Pueblo was operating the
airport "as an arm of the state for the public good on behalf of the state rather than
itself."Id. at 810. Accordingly, the court held that the municipality's actions were immune
from antitrust liability. The court failed to address whether the anticompetitive fuel-tying
arrangement was directed or authorized by the state. Had it done so, the court would
have found that a state's broad grant of authority to a municipality to operate an airport,
did not reflect a state policy to displace competition in the purchase of aviation fuel.
The foregoing decisions may reflect a reticence on the part of some members of the
judiciary to expose municipalities to antitrust liability because of the financially devastating consequences that may result by imposing treble damages liability on these
governmental units. Because of this concern, courts may continue to find a state action
exemption for municipalities where no such exemption would exist if these courts properly applied the state action doctrine. If this is the case, then perhaps plaintiffs, as well
as the purposes of the antitrust laws, would be better served by a judicial rule or federal
legislation which would provide that if a local government violates the antitrust laws, a
plaintiff can obtain either single damages and an injunction or no relief if the regulation
promotes the health and safety of a local government's residents.

